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ITALIAN ABSTRACT 
 
Con attenzione sociale si intende l’abilità, che generalmente caratterizza gli esseri umani così 
come altre specie animali, di orientare le proprie risorse attentive in risposta agli indizi spaziali che 
provengono dagli altri individui. Questi indizi spaziali sono rappresentati, tipicamente, dalla direzione 
dello sguardo, della testa e dall’orientamento del corpo. La presenti tesi si è focalizzata, 
principalmente, sul ruolo giocato da alcune variabili di tipo sociale nel modulare tale abilità. 
Nel Capitolo 1 è discusso il concetto di attenzione sociale e la sua importanza nella 
regolazione delle interazioni sociali. Nel Capitolo 2 presento quattro studi nei quali ho utilizzato il 
paradigma di orientamento attentivo mediato dallo sguardo. Questo paradigma consente di valutare il 
ruolo della direzione dello sguardo nel modulare l’attenzione sociale. In questi quattro studi, le variabili 
sociali da me manipolate sono state lo status sociale (Studio 1) e l’affiliazione politica (Studio 2). 
Inoltre, ho approfondito il ruolo dell’apprendimento implicito di variabili sociali sull’orientamento 
attentivo mediato dallo sguardo (Studio 3). Lo studio finale (Studio 4), ha indagato l’attenzione sociale 
in pazienti schizofrenici, nei quali l’abilità di elaborare stimoli sociali risulta generalmente 
compromessa. Nel Capitolo 3, presento un particolare aspetto legato all’attenzione sociale noto come 
inibizione di ritorno sociale, un fenomeno per il quale gli individui risultano più lenti nel compiere un 
movimento verso una posizione spaziale precedentemente raggiunta da un altro individuo. In questo 
caso, ho manipolato la somiglianza percepita tra i partecipanti (Studio 5). In fine, nel Capitolo 4 
presento alcune evidenze che sottolineano come la direzione dello sguardo, in combinazione con 
l’appartenenza etnica, sia una variabile cruciale implicata non solo nei processi attentivi ma addirittura 
nei processi di codifica e mantenimento dell’identità di un volto nella memoria visiva a breve termine 
(Studio 6). Per concludere, nel Capitolo 5, una discussione generale sottolinea l’importanza di 
considerare le variabili sociali nello studio dell’attenzione sociale e invita l’idea di considerare 
l’utilizzo paradigmi sperimentali sempre più ecologici, in modo tale da permettere di studiare il 
fenomeno dell’attenzione sociale durante vere interazioni tra individui che avvengono in contesti 
sociali reali. 
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ENGLISH ABSTRACT 
 
Social attention refers to the ability, which generally characterizes human beings as well as 
other animal species, to orient attentional resources in response to spatial cues provided by other 
individuals. These spatial cues are typically represented by gaze direction, head direction, and body 
orientation. This thesis focused mainly on the role that some social variables play in modulating this 
ability. 
In Chapter 1, the concept of social attention and its relevance in regulating social interactions 
are discussed. After that, in Chapter 2, I present four studies in which I have employed the gaze-cueing 
paradigm. This allows to investigate the role of gaze direction in modulating social attention. In these 
four studies, the social variables manipulated have been social status (Study 1) and political affiliation 
(Study 2). Moreover, I have also investigated the impact of implicit social learning on gaze cueing 
(Study 3). The final study (Study 4), investigated social attention in schizophrenic patients, who are 
known to be particularly impaired in dealing with social stimuli. In Chapter 3, I present a particular 
aspect of social attention known as social inhibition of return, a phenomenon whereby an individual is 
slower to reach a location previously explorer by another individual. Here, I have manipulated the 
social similarity between participants (Study 5). Finally, in Chapter 4, I present some evidence 
supporting the view that gaze direction, in combination with racial group membership, represents a 
crucial variable not only for attentional mechanisms but even for the encoding and maintenance of 
face’s visual representations in visual working memory (Study 6). To conclude, in Chapter 5, a general 
discussion highlights the importance of considering social variables in the study of social attention, 
inviting to embrace a more ecological research approach in order to investigate this phenomenon 
during real social interactions and in real world settings. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WHAT IS SOCIAL ATTENTION? 
 
Let’s try to imagine the following scenario. It is a relaxed Saturday morning 
and we are heading, as usual, towards our favourite bar to have a coffee with some 
friends. We are walking slowly, enjoying the last warm sun of September, along a 
busy city street. Suddenly we notice that a couple of individuals, who were walking 
some metres ahead of us, have stopped and are gazing upwards. Our first, 
spontaneous, and instinctive reaction is to orient our own focus towards the same 
spatial location in order to understand what has captured the attention of the two guys. 
Surely this scenario is happened quite often to all of us. Indeed, as humans 
beings, we are particularly interested in where other individuals are directing their 
attention, since this can help us to obtain an empathic contact with others and also to 
discover potentially relevant information in the environment (Emery, 2000). 
Researchers interested in social cognition started to investigate this phenomenon, 
referring to it as “social attention” (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton & 
Bruce, 1999; Nummenmaa & Calder, 2008). The importance of social attention has 
been highlighted by several lines of evidence. For instance, human beings seem to be 
equipped from birth with a cognitive mechanism specialized in elaborating social cues 
(e.g., Scaife & Bruner, 1975), and several neuroimaging studies proposed that social 
attention would be actually regulated by some devoted neural circuits (e.g., 
Kingstone, Friesen, & Gazzaniga, 2000; Klein, Shepherd, & Platt, 2009; Nummenmaa 
& Calder, 2008; Perrett el al., 1990). Furthermore, evidence is accumulating reporting 
a modulation of social cues on our attentional mechanisms even at a behavioural level 
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(Emery, 2000; for reviews see Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000 and Frieschen, Bayliss, 
& Tipper, 2006). 
The direction of another person’s attention can be inferred by several social 
cues but, generally, during a normal social interaction individuals would tend to use 
gaze, head, and body orientation to reach this goal. In fact, “[…] from other people’s 
eye gaze, head and body orientation we readily detect their focus of attention, orient 
our own attention to the same location and draw social-cognitive inferences 
regarding their goals, intentions and actions […]” (p. 135, Nummenmaa & Calder, 
2008), an evidence also supported by pioneering neurophysiological studies 
conducted on non-human primates (e.g., Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & Perrett, 2000; 
Perrett et al., 1990; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992; Wachsmuth, Oram, & 
Perrett, 1994). In these studies, it has been described the existence of population of 
cells located in the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) of the macaque temporal lobe, a 
complex area involved in coding biological motion and social processing, which were 
very sensitive to conjunctions of eye gaze, head and body position. For instance, those 
cells that were particularly active when presented with eye gaze looking rightwards 
also responded strongly when the head was directed rightwards and even when the 
whole body was directed rightwards. 
As with macaques, also in humans the STS region seems to be particularly 
sensitive to social cues (e.g., Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Calder et al., 2007) 
and evidence is accumulating showing that it is part of a wider network devoted to 
social perception, with particular regards to face processing (e.g., Adolphs, 2001; 
Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). This neural network would include the parietal cortex, in 
particular the intraparietal sulcus, which is implicated in orienting of attention (e.g., 
Rafal, 1996), the lateral fusiform gyrus, involved in the processing of face identity 
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and the amygdala, involved in the processing of the emotional content of the stimuli 
(i.e., facial expression). Interestingly, lesions of the amygdala can lead to deficits 
either in judgement of facial expression that in judgement of gaze direction (e.g., 
Cristinzio, N’Diaye, Seeck, Vuilleumier, & Sander, 2010), and amygdala damages 
can also impair the ability to use eye gaze direction as a cue to direct attention (e.g., 
Akiyama, et al., 2007), suggesting that this area could be involved in many processes 
regarding face and gaze processing. In support of this view there are also some 
imaging investigations which have found that amygdala activity can be actually 
modulated by eye gaze direction (e.g., Kawashima et al., 1999; Ochsner, 2004; 
Richeson et al., 2003) and also the Study 6 can be seen as an attempt to provide 
further evidence in support of this view. 
How would individuals would use spatial signals provided by gaze, head and 
body orientation of others to shape social attention? A possible answer comes, again, 
from the studies conducted by Perrett and colleagues (Perrett et al., 1992; Perrett & 
Emery, 1994). They proposed a model, known as Direction-of-Attention Detector 
(DAD), in which these three social signals would interact following a hierarchical 
sequence in which eye gaze would represent the most important cue, followed by 
head and finally by body. Thus, in the case eye gaze of another individual is visible, 
we would tend to use information provided by this cue which will override 
information provided by the head and the body. In turn, in the case eye gaze is 
occluded we would tend to use information provided by the head which will override 
information provided by the body. Finally, in the case that neither the head is visible, 
spatial information regarding others’ focus of attention will be inferred by body 
orientation, which can include also pointing gestures (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of the cascade model of social attention known as 
Direction-of-Attention Detector (DAD; e.g., Perrett et al., 1992). In this example, social cues (gaze, 
head, and body orientation) provided by an individual are all pointing rightwards. According to this 
model, in the case all these three cues are available for processing, individuals would process them 
following a hierarchal sequence in which gaze direction would represent the most important and 
relevant social cue, followed by head direction and, lastly, by body orientation (redrawn from Emery, 
2000). 
 
However, this cascade model has been questioned by some studies which 
reported that these three social cues (i.e., gaze direction, head direction, body 
orientation) can influence social attention independently (e.g., Hietanen, 1999, 2002; 
Langton, 2000; Langton & Bruce, 2000). In these studies participants were presented 
simultaneously with centrally-placed couples of social cues, such gaze and head 
(Hietanen, 1999; Langton, 2000), head and pointing gestures (Langton & Bruce, 
2000), or head and body (Hietanen, 2002), which could point towards the same or a 
different spatial positions. Participants were asked to perform speeded discriminative 
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responses based on different requests, such as discriminating the direction of one of 
the cues ignoring the other, or discriminating the position of a lateralized target. In all 
these cases, the results showed that spatial information was automatically analysed 
from both cues. This provides evidence in support of a model of social attention in 
which these three social cues would be processed in a parallel, rather than in a 
sequential, manner. Therefore, in light of this evidence, it is clear that the DAD model 
would need to be revised. 
Despite others’ focus of attention can be inferred by different cues, eye gaze 
still remains probably the most salient and commonly investigated cue used in social 
attention processes (Emery, 2000). Gaze-following abilities are common not only 
among humans but even among other several animal species such as, for instance, 
non-human primates, birds, dogs and dolphins (e.g., Deaner, Shepherd, & Platt, 2007; 
for a review see Shepherd, 2010). Moreover, Baron-Cohen (1995) suggested that, in 
humans, the ability to use gaze direction in social attention is considered to be 
anticipator to more complex socio-cognitive skills. In fact, in his “Mindreading 
Model” he proposed (and emphasized) the existence of an Eye-Direction Detector 
(EDD), namely a functionally specialized module that would be devoted, firstly, to 
detect the presence of eyes or eye-like stimuli (see also Levy, Foulsham, & 
Kingstone, 2013), secondly to compute the direction of gaze and, thirdly, to attribute 
the mental state of “seeing” to an agent with gaze pointed towards something or 
someone. The EDD module, in combination with other modules that in the present 
thesis will not be discussed, would contribute to the development of the most 
sophisticated (and even the most popular) module in the “Mindreading Model”, 
namely the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM). Purpose of ToMM would be 
twofold: on the one hand, it would permit to infer others’ mental states (e.g., 
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believing, deceiving, thinking, etc.) directly from their observable behaviour and, on 
the other hand, it would integrate the knowledge related to these mental states into a 
theory that individuals would be able to use in order to explain and predict others’ 
behaviour. Interestingly, many neurodevelopmental and mental disorders 
characterized by deficits in domain of ToMM, showed impairments in gaze following 
abilities. These mental disorders include, for instance, Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD; e.g., Dawson et al., 2004; Marotta et al., 2012), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD; Marotta et al., 2013) and schizophrenia (e.g., Akiyama et al., 
2008). Despite the indisputable relevance of the model proposed by Baron-Cohen in 
influencing and inspiring research in social attention, and more generally in social 
cognition, considering eye gaze as the unique social cue involved in the development 
of ToMM could be not entirely correct. 
The mutual influence which the different social cues play in modulating social 
attention (e.g., Langton et al., 2000), induced researcher to present eye gaze, head and 
body stimuli in isolation and many different paradigms have been proposed to reach 
this goal. Among these, many researchers started to employ some variations of the 
spatial cueing paradigm made popular by Posner (e.g., Posner, 1980). In a typical 
Posner’s paradigm, participants are instructed to fixate at a central spot that marks the 
centre of the screen. The central spot is then replaced by a central cue (i.e., an arrow) 
which typically points rightwards or leftwards. After a certain period of time 
(Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, SOA), participants are asked to respond to the onset of 
a target, that can appear to the left or right of the central cue, by making a speeded 
keypress response. Faster Reaction Times (RTs) and a greater accuracy with targets 
appearing in the previously cued location (compared to those appearing in the uncued 
location) are taken as the proof that participants shifted their attention towards the 
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cued location. Researchers interested in social attention replaced the symbolic arrow 
cues with social cues (e.g., averted gaze, pointing gestures, etc.). In this regards, one 
of the most commonly used Posner-like paradigm is the gaze-cueing paradigm, that 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, in which pictures depicting faces with 
averted gaze are used as cueing stimuli (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). In so doing, 
Friesen and Kingstone created an elegant and versatile tool, which merges elements 
belonging both to cognitive (i.e., visual attention) and social (i.e., ecologically valid 
stimuli such as faces or body parts) psychology, to study social attention. Indeed, 
since its introduction, evidence is accumulating showing that during social 
interactions, attentional mechanisms can be modulated by several social variables 
which characterized individuals, and the experiments illustrated in Chapter 2 will 
provide further evidence supporting this view. 
Despite Posner-like paradigms like the gaze-cueing paradigm are immensely 
valuable in investigating different aspects of social attention, it is worth to point out 
that clear differences distinguishes the way attention operates in the presence of real 
rather than simulated people. To overcome this limit, which strongly affect the 
ecological validity of the results, some researchers initiated to present participants 
with social cues provided directly from real individuals. For instance, Lachat and 
collaborators developed an innovative experimental setup to investigate gaze cueing 
of attention during a real face-to-face situation (Lachat, Conty, Hugueville, & George, 
2012; Lachat, Hugueville, Lemaréchal, Conty, & George, 2012). Another concrete 
example of how the presence of other individuals can influence the attention of an 
observer is the phenomenon known as Social Inhibition of Return (SIOR; Welsh et 
al., 2005), which consists of the observation that participants are slower to initiate a 
reaching action towards a location previously explored to by another individual. SIOR 
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will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. I think that the perspective to move 
towards a more ecological approach in the study of social attention, employing and 
developing paradigms inspired by real-world observations or even in which 
participants are tested in real world setting, represent the frontier towards which 
researchers should look in next years. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in 
the final chapter of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SOCIAL MODULATORS OF GAZE-CUEING OF ATTENTION 
 
Even if several social cues contribute to communicate social attention (e.g., 
gaze direction, head direction, body orientation), facial stimuli provide probably the 
most refined and complex source of information. Indeed, when we are observing 
others’ faces, we are able not only to infer the focus of attention, but even the 
identities, the intentions, the emotions and the beliefs of the individuals with whom 
we are interacting (Emery, 2000). For these reasons, it is not surprising that humans 
seem to be especially sensitive to facial stimuli and in particular to a specific feature 
of the faces, namely the eye region (Emery, 2000; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005). In fact, 
it seems that we are already equipped from birth with a cognitive mechanism that 
promotes the processing of eyes (e.g., Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002) and 
evidence is accumulating showing that this region is the most attended when adults 
are asked to freely scanning faces (e.g., Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008a, 
2008b; Itier, Alain, Sedore, & McIntosh, 1997). 
As anticipated in Chapter 1, the effectiveness of eyes in orienting attention 
towards other parts of the visual field indicated by their gaze direction has been 
mainly tested through the gaze-cueing paradigm (e.g., Dalmaso, Fuentes, & Galfano, 
2012; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Galfano et al., 2011; for a review see Frieschen et 
al., 2007). Specifically, this consists in presenting a central face with direct gaze that 
moves its eyes towards a specific spatial location. After a Stimulus Onset Asynchrony 
(SOA) which can be both fixed and variable, a target requiring some kind of response 
appears in a peripheral location that can be congruent or incongruent to gaze direction 
(see Figure 2). Generally, this task triggers rapid (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; 
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Brignani, Guzzon, Marzi, & Miniussi, 2009) and reflexive (e.g., Driver et al., 1999; 
Galfano et al., 2012; Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009) shifts of attention towards the spatial 
location indicated by gaze, as suggested by the fact that RTs to targets occurring at the 
cued location (i.e., congruent trials) are typically smaller than those to targets 
appearing at an uncued location (i.e., incongruent trials). This is known as gaze-
cueing effect. Interesting, in the case the duration of SOA is particularly long (i.e., 
2400 ms), it is possible to observe an inhibitory after-effect known as Inhibition of 
Return (IOR; e.g., Frischen & Tipper, 2004). IOR, which has been traditionally 
observed using peripheral cues, refers to the slowing of responses to targets appearing 
in previously attended locations. This mechanism would expedite visual search, 
preventing that attention returns to spatial locations previously inspected (e.g., for 
reviews see Klein, 2000 and Lupiáñez, Klein, & Bartolomeo, 2006). 
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Figure 2. Illustration of stimuli and sequence of events that can be used in a gaze-cueing 
paradigm. The centrally-placed cueing face is firstly presented with gaze directed to the participants 
(Fixation frame). After that, the same face can look either leftwards (A) or rightwards (B & C; Cue 
frame). Finally, a target can either appear in a congruent (A) or in an incongruent (B & C) spatial 
position with regards to gaze direction (Target frame). Evidence of gaze-cueing effect has been 
achieved by presenting different types of face stimuli, such as schematic faces (A; e.g., Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998), photographs of real individuals (B; e.g., Driver et al., 1999) and computer-generated 
avatars (C; Bayliss et al., 2005). Redrawn from Frischen et al. (2006). 
 
It is important to note that, generally, the strong automaticity that seems to 
characterize the gaze-cueing effect has been observed using schematic faces (e.g., 
Akiyama et al., 2007; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Galfano et al., 2012; Kuhn et al., 
2011). This means that participants were presented with some extremely 
impoverished social stimuli that did not convey any kind of social information, except 
for gaze direction. However, faces that we meet in real life interaction vary along 
several social dimensions and gaze is a key factor in the regulation of social 
interactions. For this reason, it is not surprisingly that when in a gaze-cueing task real 
rather than schematic faces are used, it is possible to observe a modulation of gaze-
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cueing effect due to the social factors that characterized face stimuli. Indeed, it is well 
known that the specific type of relationship between the perceiver and the observed 
person can impact onto the attention devoted to gaze. In fact, on the one hand, 
features of the cuing face can alter the magnitude of gaze cuing. For instance, a 
greater gaze-cueing effect has been observed in response to faces characterized by 
signals of physical dominance (Jones et al., 2010; Jones, Main, Little, & DeBruine, 
2011; Ohlsen, van Zoest, & van Vugt, 2013) or in response to fearful rather than 
happy faces (e.g., Kuhn & Tipples, 2011; Tipples, 2006). On the other hand, 
participants’ individual differences have also been shown to play a critical role. 
Indeed, a greater gaze-cuing effect has been observed in females with respect to males 
(Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005), and people with higher need for 
belongingness (Wilkowski, Robinson, & Friesen, 2009) and higher levels of anxiety 
(Fox, Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007). 
The next set of experiments have been carried out to explore in more detail the 
potential impact of some social factors in modulating the gaze-cueing effect. In 
particular, in Study 1, I have investigated the impact of social status, which represents 
one of the most important indexes used by humans (and many other animal species) to 
modulate their behaviour (e.g., Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). In Study 2, I have 
addressed the role played by political affiliation in moderating the gaze-cueing effect. 
A previous study reported a reduced gaze-cueing effect in conservatives but not in 
liberals (Dodd, Hibbing, & Smith, 2011). Study 3 has been carried out to explore the 
potential impact of implicitly-learned social information on the gaze cueing effect. 
Finally, Study 4 has been conducted in schizophrenic patients, a clinical population 
characterized by serious impairments in processing social stimuli, with particular 
regards to eye gaze (e.g., Tso, Mui, Taylor, & Deldin, 2012).  
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2.1. Study 1 
Social status gates social attention in humans 
 
Dalmaso, M., Pavan, G., Castelli, L., & Galfano, G. (2012). Social status gates social 
attention in humans. Biology Letters, 8, 450-452. 
 
Dalmaso, M., Galfano, G., Coricelli, C., & Castelli, L. (Submitted). Temporal 
dynamics underlying the modulation of social status on social attention. 
 
Social status deeply shapes our social interactions. According to sociologists, 
social status can be described as “[…] the prestige accorded to individuals because of 
the abstract positions they occupy rather than because of immediately observable 
behaviour […]” (p. 1147, Gould, 2002). Generally, high-status individuals tend to use 
their prestige in order to establish and maintain a set of social norms that define which 
behavior is permitted, obligated or prohibited within a determined social group (e.g., 
Cummins, 2000), leading to hierarchically organized societies (e.g., Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). Social status is highly relevant since infancy (e.g., Boyce, 2004; 
Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2006; Pellegrini et al., 2011) and becomes even more 
important during adolescence (e.g., Bowker, Rubin, Buskirk-Cohen, Rose-Krasnor, & 
Booth-LaForce, 2010; Lansu, Cillessen, & Karremans, 2013). Under an evolutionary 
perspective, differences in status are also associated to an asymmetric distribution of 
resources (e.g., Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1976; Fiske, 1992). Therefore, the ability to 
readily and accurately infer the social status of others represents an essential skill for 
both humans and nonhuman species to successfully navigate and, in some 
circumstances, also to survive within social groups characterized by different degrees 
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of complexity (e.g., Cummins, 2000). Social status can be inferred from physical 
traits signalling physical dominance (e.g., facial features, body size, body postures, 
etc.), especially among nonhuman species such as bees and ants (e.g., Wilson, 2000), 
fishes (e.g., Grosenick, Celement, & Fernald, 2007), rats (e.g., Davis, 1992) and 
primates (e.g., Maestripieri, 1996). In the case of humans, social status is mainly 
inferred from specific knowledge about personal characteristics such as educational 
qualification, job, and material wealth. This implies that, especially in human 
communities, inferences about social hierarchies are mainly a function of the 
perceived intellectual capacities and skills of the individuals rather than their 
perceived physical strength. 
Because of the importance of social status in regulating social interactions 
among humans, several studies have explored the effects of this social variable on 
human cognitive processes. For instance, it has recently been shown that high-status 
faces are recognized significantly better than low-status faces, likely because they are 
coded more accurately (see Ratcliff, Hugenberg, Shriver, & Bernstein, 2011, 
Experiment 1). In addition, high-status faces are better attended to and processed 
more holistically than low-status faces (see Ratcliff et al., 2011, Experiments 2 and 3). 
Furthermore, social status affects the perception of facially-expressed emotions, so 
that anger is perceived to appear sooner and to last longer on the faces of high-status 
individuals compared to low-status targets (Ratcliff, Franklin, Nelson, & Vescio, 
2012). 
More relevant for the present study, social status seems to be also involved in 
regulating social attention. A pioneer animal study reported that submissive macaque 
monkeys (macaca mulatta) showed a generalized gaze-cuing effect independently of 
whether the face stimulus depicted a high- or a low-status individual, whereas 
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dominant macaque monkeys selectively followed the gaze of high-status individuals 
(Shepherd, Deaner & Platt, 2006; but see Teufel, Gutmann, Pirow, & Fischer, 2010c, 
for a non-significant effect of social ranking on gaze following). Dominant-like 
exemplars, who are likely to have elevated testosterone levels, are more closely 
attended to and trigger stronger gaze-cuing effects. A related modulation has recently 
been demonstrated also in humans, who show greater gaze-cuing effects for 
artificially masculinized than for feminized faces (Jones et al., 2010, 2011; Ohlsen et 
al., 2013). Indeed, many studies have reported a positive relationships between 
masculine facial features and the perceived dominance (e.g., Perrett et al. 1998). As 
already pointed out, although physical shapes and hormonal levels can deeply 
influence individual ranking within the group (Mazur & Booth, 1998), especially in 
human communities social hierarchies are to a large extent determined by intellectual 
capacities and skills, so that power positions are not necessarily occupied by the 
physically strongest individuals. In this case, there might be no reliable perceptual 
cues that allow the perceivers to infer the relative social status of other individuals but 
one has to rely on episodic learning. 
In the present research, I have addressed the impact of social status 
information on social attention in humans, independently of the physiognomic traits 
of the cuing face. To this end, I have conducted three experiments in which I have 
employed a standard gaze-cuing paradigm (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) and 
manipulated the status of the cuing faces via a preliminary learning phase. 
Specifically, I used different face stimuli and two versions of fictive curriculum vitae 
(CV) conveying opposite social status information. Participants were asked to read 
CVs in which half of the face stimuli were associated to a high social status and the 
other half to a low social status. The association between status and faces was 
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counterbalanced between participants (Experiment 1) or randomly established 
(Experiments 2/A and 2/B). I thus manipulated social status so as to associate each 
stimulus face to both high and low status. In so doing, there was no correlation 
between social status and the perceptual features of the faces used as stimuli in the 
gaze-cuing task. In all the three experiments, my expectation was to observe greater 
gaze-cuing effects for the faces that in each condition were presented as high-status 
individuals. Furthermore, in Experiments 2/A and 2/B I have explored in more detail 
the temporal dynamics underlying this modulation. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
In Experiment 1 I aimed to address whether the social status of the cuing face 
can modulate the gaze-cueing effect. Participants were asked to look at the faces of 16 
individuals and read fictive CV associated with each of them that could describe the 
person as having a high or low social status. The association between each specific 
face and either high or low social status was counterbalanced between participants. 
The same faces were then used as stimuli in a gaze-cuing task. I expected to observe a 
greater gaze-cueing effect in response to high- than to low-status faces. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Forty-six undergraduates (Mean age = 23 years, SD = 2.71, 30 females) from 
the University of Padova participated as volunteers. All had normal or corrected-to-
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normal vision. The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. The local ethic committee approved the study. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Sixteen full-colour photos of adult males bearing a neutral expression were 
used as stimuli. In particular eight older adults aged between 50 and 60 years 
(00082_931230_fa, 00172_931230_fa, 00474_940519_fa, 00714_941201_fa, 
00739_941201_fb, 00919_960620_fa, 00950_960627_fa, 00955_960627_fb) and six 
20 years old younger adults (00129_931230_fb, 00253_940128_fa, 
00591_940928_fa, 00658_941121_fa, 00659_941121_fa, 00695_941121_fa) were 
selected from “The Color FERET Database” (Phillips, Wechsler, Huang, & Rauss, 
1998), while two younger adults apparently aged around 20 years (00272012, 
00811015) were selected from “The PUT Face Database” (Kasiński, Florek, & 
Schmidt, 2008). Any element of asymmetry (e.g., moles, birthmark, earrings) was 
removed using The Gimp 2.6 (The Gimp Team, http://www.gimp.org). In order to 
induce an association between faces and social status, participants were asked to read 
fictive CVs associated with each face. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions. In condition 1, the CVs of older adults emphasized that they had a 
relative high social status (e.g. ‘Dean of a Faculty of Architecture. President of the 
European Eco-Sustainable Constructions Society’), while younger adults had a 
relative low social status (e.g. ‘After the compulsory education he started to work as a 
workman in a textile industry.’). In condition 2, the same faces of condition 1 were 
used, but in this case different CVs were administered to participants, in which social 
status information related to older and younger adults was reversed (e.g. younger 
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adults: ‘Graduated with honours in physics. He is currently working as researcher in a 
famous European laboratory’; older adults: ‘Retired factory worker. He did not 
complete primary school’; see Appendix A). In this manner, in two conditions, the 
same faces were associated with opposite social status information. Status was mainly 
related to educational/academic information that was highly relevant for the 
participants recruited in the study (i.e. undergraduate students). A perfect correlation 
between age and status within each condition was created so, as to facilitate the 
retrieval of the information about the status of the face stimuli during the gaze-cuing 
task. CVs were pretested with a sample of ten students (9 females) from the same 
population who took part in the experiment. Participants were shown the eight CVs of 
the individuals belonging to one specific group (e.g., high-status younger adults) and 
asked to report the perceived status of this group of people. Status was defined as the 
capacity of having an active role within the society so that to gain power and hold 
leading positions. Responses were provided along a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very 
low, 7 = very high). Each participant evaluated all four groups of individuals (i.e., 
high-status older adults, low-status younger adults, high-status younger adults, low-
status older adults). A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Social status (high vs. 
low) and Age (older vs. younger adults) as within-participants factors showed a strong 
effect of status, F(1,9) = 67.5, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.88. High-status groups (M = 6.2, SE 
= 0.15) were indeed perceived as having a higher status as compared to low-status 
groups (M = 3.2, SE = 0.29). No age effect was found, but the interaction was 
significant, F(1,9) = 17.03, p < 0.005, η2p = 0.65. This was due to the fact that the 
evaluations toward older adults tended to be more polarized as compared to those 
toward younger adults. Importantly, however, the difference between the high- and 
low-status group was significant both when the older adults, t(9) = 6.33, p < 0.001, 
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and the younger adults, t(9) = 7.68, p < 0.001, represented the high-status group. 
Overall, these data indicate that the CVs were effective in inducing differences in 
perceived status. Immediately after having read the CVs, participants took part in a 
gaze-cuing task in which the same 16 faces were used as cuing faces. 
Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by a PC running E-
Prime 1.1. Participants sat approximately 57 cm from a 17-inch monitor (1024 × 768 
pixel, 60 Hz). Stimuli were presented on a black background. Each trial began with 
the presentation of a white fixation cross (0.82°) in the centre of the screen for 900 ms 
(Fixation frame, Figure 3), followed by a central face (21.2° height × 14° width) with 
direct gaze (Face frame). After 900 ms, the same face appeared with averted gaze 
(Cue frame). This photograph was obtained by moving the irises 0.25° to the right or 
to the left from the original central position using The Gimp v. 2.6. After 200 ms, a 
white target letter (L or T, 0.82°) appeared 11° to the left or right of the centre of the 
screen in one of two possible locations: spatially congruent or incongruent with gaze 
direction. The target frame remained visible until a response was provided. Gaze 
direction was uninformative as regards target location and participants were instructed 
to maintain fixation at the centre of the screen. Instructions emphasized both response 
speed and accuracy. Participants responded using their right and left index fingers. 
Half of the participants were instructed to press the ‘K’ key of a standard keyboard if 
the target was an ‘L’, and the ‘D’ key if the target was a ‘T’. The remaining 
participants responded using the opposite map- ping. In the case of a wrong response, 
the text ‘ERROR’ appeared in white centred on the screen for 500 ms. There were 64 
trials for each condition defined by congruency between gaze direction and target 
location (congruent vs. incongruent) and social status (high vs. low), for a total of 256 
trials presented in a random order. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of stimuli (not drawn to scale) and sequence of events for (A) a spatially 
congruent trial with an older adult and letter ‘L’ target and (B) a spatially incongruent trial with a 
younger adult and letter ‘T’ target. 
 
Results 
 
All trials in which participants committed an error (3.62%) were removed. 
Preliminary analyses of RTs showed that participant’s gender had no effect, and 
therefore, this factor was not considered. A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-design repeated-measures 
ANOVA was conducted with Cue-target spatial congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) and Social status (high vs. low) as within-participants factors, and 
Condition (condition 1 vs. condition 2) as between-participant factor. The main effect 
of Cue-target congruency was significant, F(1,44) = 13.071, p = 0.001, η2p = .229, 
owing to faster RTs on congruent (M = 520 ms, SE = 9.56) than on incongruent (M = 
530 ms, SE = 8.62) trials. Critically, the Cue-target congruency × Social status 
interaction was also significant, F(1,44) = 6.141, p = 0.017, η2p = .122. Two-tailed 
paired-samples t-tests indicated that participants shifted their attention in response to 
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the averted gaze of high-status faces, t(45) = 3.808, p = 0.01, but not in response to 
the averted gaze of low-status faces, t(45) = 1.381, p = 0.174 (Figure 4). No other 
significant effect emerged (ps > .163). This overall pattern is inconsistent with the 
possibility that the physiognomic traits of the specific faces used in the present study 
played a relevant role in the gaze-cuing effects that I found. A second mixed-design 
repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on the percentage of errors with the same 
factors as earlier revealed a main effect of cue-target spatial congruency, F(1,44= 
7.036, p = .011, η2p = .138, reflecting more errors on incongruent (M = 3.89 %, SE = 
0.53) than on congruent (M = 2.93 %, SE = 0.54) trials. No other significant effect 
emerged (ps > .113). Thus, speed-accuracy trade-off cannot account for the present 
findings. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean RTs collapsed across conditions for spatially congruent (dark grey) and 
incongruent (light grey) trials as a function of the social status of the cuing face. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. Double asterisks denote t-test p < 0.01. 
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Discussion 
 
It is well-known that social status deeply shapes social interactions, and that 
humans are particularly sensitive to social hierarchies (e.g., Chiao, Bordeaux, & 
Ambady, 2004; Freeman, Penner, Saperstein, Scheutz, & Ambady, 2011; for a review 
see Dalmaso, submitted). Indeed, people preferentially allocate attentional resources 
to high-status individuals. In this regard, it has recently been demonstrated that people 
tend to gaze at high-status individuals more often and for longer than at low-status 
individuals (e.g., Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010) and that 
high-status faces are better encoded in memory and processed more holistically 
(Ratcliff et al., 2011). Based on the idea that high-status individuals could be 
considered as more relevant sources of information when compared with low-status 
individuals, it has been hypothesized that gaze cuing could be influenced by perceived 
social status (e.g., Shepherd et al., 2006). 
The present results demonstrate that information regarding social status 
acquired through episodic learning is sufficient to moderate gaze cuing in humans. 
Indeed, participants consistently shifted attention only in response to the averted gaze 
of a face that was described as depicting a high-status individual. This suggests that 
gaze cuing is not immune to top-down influences, so that it can be conceived as a 
conditionally automatic process, which is modulated by contextually relevant social 
information (e.g., Foulsham et al., 2010; see also Teufel et al., 2009; Teufel, Alexis, 
Clayton, & Davis, 2010a; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010b). 
The perception of social status can be derived from at least two different 
sources of information. One is related to the physiognomic traits of the face, and 
previous research showed that gaze cuing is significantly reduced (if not totally 
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abolished) for apparently less dominant faces (e.g., ones et al., 2010). Moreover, a 
recent study observed a reduced gaze-cueing effect also for white than for black faces 
(Pavan, Dalmaso, Galfano, & Castelli, 2011). Indeed, at least in most Western 
societies, White people can be considered as the majority group, in that they are more 
likely associated to higher positions within the society as compared to Black people 
(Castelli, Zogmaister, & Tomelleri, 2009). Alternatively, the perception of social 
status can rely on verbal social information concerning the specific roles one has 
within the group. This latter source of information is especially relevant among 
humans, for whom achievements based on intellectual capacities more heavily shape 
social hierarchies. My findings show that, even when the impact of physiognomic 
traits is controlled for by counter- balancing the face-status association, social status 
influences gaze cuing, so that this phenomenon is magnified when participants view 
faces of high-status individuals, irrespective of their facial characteristics. On the 
basis of the verbal information received, people build up exemplar-based 
representations that are then retrieved when performing the gaze-cuing task. This 
mechanism appears to be highly adaptive for regulating social life. Indeed, it implies 
that we rapidly encode the relative social status of the individuals populating our 
environment and we shape our social attention processes accordingly. The fact that 
humans selectively attend to the locations gazed by high-status individuals might be 
interpreted as further evidence of the possible existence of a cognitive process that 
boosts the identification and monitoring of high-status individuals (e.g., DeWall & 
Maner, 2008; Foulsham et al., 2010; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). This mechanism is 
likely to be particularly relevant for low-status individuals who more heavily depend 
on high-status individuals (Shepherd et al., 2006). Supportive evidence in favour of 
this hypothesis comes also from studies using neuroimaging techniques. Recent 
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research provided the first evidence that some neural circuits can be modulated by 
social status, both in humans (e.g., Beasley, Sabatinelli & Obasi, 2012; Chiao et al., 
2008; Hogeveen, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2013; Kumaran, Melo, & Duzel, 2012; Ly, 
Haynes, Barter, Weinberger, & Zink, 2011; Muscatell et al., 2012) and in nonhuman 
primates (for a review see Chiao, 2010). These pioneering results strengthen the 
notion that individuals from several species are equipped with a neural network 
devoted to the elaboration of social status information.  
The next two experiments have been carried out to address in more detail this 
issue, as well as the time-course of the interaction between social processing and gaze 
cuing, in order to clarify whether the observed modulation reflects early-rising 
reflexive mechanisms. 
 
Experiment 2/A 
 
Experiment 1 provided evidence that social status information acquired 
through episodic learning can shape social attention processes. However, it is 
unknown whether very fast exposure to a face is sufficient to extract social status 
information which in turn affects allocation of spatial attention. In Experiment 2/A, I 
have addressed this issue by keeping the SOA constant at 200 ms, and manipulating 
the duration of the direct-gaze face frame, that could be either 50 or 900 ms. For the 
long duration, I expected to replicate the results reported in Experiment 1. As for the 
brief duration, different hypotheses could be put forward. On the one hand, one may 
hypothesize that retrieving this episodic information may require a substantial amount 
of time. Because in Experiment 1 I used fixed temporal parameters and left the face 
with direct gaze available to participants for a considerable time (900 ms), one cannot 
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rule out the possibility that the observed modulation would disappear when shorter 
exposure times are used. Alternatively, since social status is a critical feature in the 
regulation of social interaction, one may predict a modulation of social attention 
processes, as indexed by gaze-cuing, also when faces are presented only briefly. This 
latter possibility would be supported by evidence showing that the valence associated 
with person-based representations is automatically retrieved (Castelli, Zogmaister, 
Smith, & Arcuri, 2004).  
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Sixty-nine undergraduates (Mean age = 21.5 years, SD = 2.7, 18 males) took 
part in the experiment on a voluntary basis. All were naive as to the purpose of the 
study and reported normal or corrected- to-normal vision. The local ethic committee 
approved the study. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Six photos of older adult males were extracted from the same set of stimuli as 
that used in Experiment 1 (00474_940519_fa, 00714_941201_fa, 00739_941201_fb, 
00919_960620_fa, 00950_960627_fa, 00955_960627_fb). 
For each face there were three different versions: one with direct gaze (i.e., the 
original photograph), one with gaze averted rightwards and one with gaze averted 
leftwards. The averted-gaze photographs were obtained by moving the irises 0.25° to 
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the right or to the left from the original central position using The Gimp v. 2.6. 
Participants sat approximately 57 cm from a 17-inch monitor (1024 × 768 pixel, 60 
Hz). A PC running E-Prime v. 1.1 handled timing and stimuli presentation. A 
standard keyboard collected manual responses. 
The whole experiment was composed of three computer-based phases: a 
learning phase, in which participants were asked to learn the social status of the face 
stimuli; an experimental phase, in which the same faces were employed in the gaze-
cuing task; a manipulation check, aimed to verify whether participants remembered 
the association between each face and the corresponding social status studied during 
the learning phase. In all phases, each face was presented alone, with constant size 
(21.2° × 14°), in a central position and against a black background.  
The learning phase consisted of presenting each face singularly, accompanied 
with a fictive CV that appeared in white letters (18-point Courier New) above the 
face. Three faces were paired to a high-status profile (e.g., ‘Dean of a Faculty of 
Architecture. President of the European Eco-Sustainable Constructions Society’), 
whereas the other three faces were paired to a low-status profile (e.g., ‘Retired factory 
worker. He did not complete primary school’; see Appendix A). The association 
between faces and profiles was randomly determined for each participant. In so doing, 
I minimized the eventual influence of the physiognomic traits of the stimulus faces. 
Status was mainly related to educational/academic information that was highly 
relevant for the participants recruited in the study (i.e., undergraduate students; see 
also Experiment 1). Participants were asked to memorize each face identity and the 
corresponding CV, with no time limits. To move from a face to another one, 
participants were asked to press the spacebar. When participants had visualized all the 
6 faces, a categorization task was administered in order to verify learning. This task 
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consisted of presenting each face for 900 ms without CV. Within that time, 
participants were required to categorize each face as depicting a high- or a low-status 
individual by pressing the ‘Y’ and the ‘B’ keys, respectively. Each face appeared 
twice for a total of 12 trials. The green text ‘CORRECT’ or the red texts ‘ERROR’ or 
‘FASTER’ appeared centrally for 2000 ms in case of a correct, an incorrect or a 
missing response, respectively. In the case participants committed at least one error in 
these 12 trials, the categorization task was administered again. Moreover, in case 
participants were unable to complete successfully the categorization task after 8 
cycles, they were presented again with both faces and their associated CVs.  
After the learning phase was successfully completed, the experimental phase 
started. This consisted of a gaze-cuing task in which the same faces used in the 
learning phase were employed. Each trial began with the presentation of a white 
fixation cross (0.82°) in the centre of the screen for 900 ms (see Figure 5), followed 
by a central face with direct gaze. After either 50 or 900 ms, the same face appeared 
with averted gaze rightwards or leftwards. After a fixed SOA of 200 ms, a white 
target letter (L or T, 0.82°) appeared 11° rightwards or leftwards from the centre of 
the screen with the same probability. The averted-gaze face and the target letter 
remained visible until a response was provided or 1500 ms had elapsed, whichever 
came first. Participants were informed that gaze direction was uninformative with 
regard to the target location, they were instructed to maintain fixation at the centre of 
the screen, to ignore gaze direction, and to respond as fast and accurately as possible. 
Half of the participants responded by pressing the ‘K’ key with their right index finger 
in case the target was a ‘L’, and the ‘D’ key with their left finger in case the target 
was a ‘T’. The remaining participants responded using the opposite mapping. In the 
case of a wrong or a missing response, the central red text ‘ERROR’ or ‘NO 
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RESPONSE’ appeared on the screen for 1500 ms. There was a practice block 
composed by 10 trials followed by 3 experimental blocks each composed of 96 trials, 
for a total of 288 experimental trials presented in a random order. 
After the experimental phase, participants were asked to take part in the 
manipulation check task. This was identical to the categorization task of the learning 
phase, the only exceptions being that a single cycle was presented and that there was 
no time limit for responding. This latter change had the purpose of maximizing 
accuracy in the responses. At the end of the experiment the participants were thanked 
and debriefed. The whole procedure took about 1 hour. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of stimuli (not drawn to scale) and sequence of events presented during a 
congruent (A) and an incongruent (B) trial in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2. 
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Results 
 
Participants who committed at least one error during the manipulation check 
(N = 13) and with a percentage of errors during the experimental phase that fell 2 SD 
above the mean (N = 1) were excluded from the analyses. Then, incorrect responses 
were removed and analysed separately (2.68% of total trials). A repeated-measures 
ANOVA was performed on median RTs with Cue-target spatial congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent), Direct-gaze face duration (50 ms vs. 900 ms) and Status 
(high vs. low) as within-participant factors. The main effect of Cue-target spatial 
congruency was significant, F(1,54) = 37.120, p <. 001, η2p = .407, owing to smaller 
RT on congruent (M = 520 ms, SE = 7.4) than on incongruent (M = 530 ms, SE = 7.3) 
trials, as well as the Cue-target spatial congruency × Status interaction, F(1,54) = 
6.388, p = .014, η2p = .106. Paired comparisons between congruent and incongruent 
trials divided by status revealed that participants oriented their attention in response to 
the averted gaze of high, t(54) = 6.440, p < .001, and low, t(54) = 2.527, p = .014, 
status faces, but the effect was greater in the former case (15 ms vs. 6 ms; see Figure 
6). Critically, the three-way Cue-target spatial congruency × Direct-gaze face duration 
× Status interaction was not significant (p = .829), confirming a comparable effect of 
social status on gaze-cuing irrespective of direct-gaze face duration (see Table 1). No 
other main effects or interactions emerged (ps > .23). 
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Figure 6. Median RTs (ms) as a function of Cue-Target Spatial Congruency and Status in 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. Asterisk denotes t-test p < .05. 
 
A second repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of 
errors with Cue-target spatial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), Direct-gaze 
face duration (50 ms vs. 900 ms) and Status (high vs. low) as within-participant 
factors. The main effect of Direct-gaze face duration approached significance, F(1,54) 
= 3.472, p = .068, η2p = .06, reflecting the tendency to commit more errors at the 
longer (M = 2.4 %, SE = .25) than at the shorter (M = 2 %, SE = .17) duration. 
Moreover, also the Cue-target spatial congruency × Direct-gaze face duration × Status 
interaction approached significance, F(1,54)= 3.88, p = .054, η2p = .067. However, the 
critical paired comparisons between congruent and incongruent trials divided by 
duration and status revealed no differences among the critical conditions (ps > .13; 
see Table 1). No other main effects or interactions emerged (ps > .253). Thus, the data 
were unlikely to be affected by any speed-accuracy trade-off. 
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Discussion 
 
The results from Experiment 2/A are interesting mainly for three reasons. 
First, they are in line with those reported in Experiment 1, namely that the tendency to 
attend to the spatial location indicated by other’s gaze direction is more pronounced in 
response to high- rather than to low-status faces. Second, in Experiment 1 faces from 
different age levels were used and, in each experimental condition, status co-varied 
with age to help building episodic knowledge. In contrast, here I used faces from a 
single age level (older adults). Hence, the present findings cast stronger evidence that 
gaze cuing is influenced by social status, in that participants could not rely upon any 
categorical cue to retrieve episodic knowledge about status. Finally, and more 
importantly, the observed gaze cuing modulation seems to emerge even when the time 
to extract social status information is particularly brief (i.e., 50 ms). This result is in 
line with previous evidence. Indeed, as for the temporal dynamics underlying the 
modulation of attentional processes elicited by social information conveyed by faces, 
there is evidence of significant effects even very brief exposures (50 ms or even less, 
see e.g. Holmes, Green, & Vuilleumier, 2005; Stone & Valentine, 2005; Trawalter, 
Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008). However, it is worth noting that, unlike all these 
previous studies in which the manipulation was based on changes in the physical 
features of the faces used as stimuli, in Experiment 2/A I observed a modulation due 
to non-visual information associated with faces. This finding suggests the possibility 
that even a top-down modulation can readily impact onto our social attention 
mechanism, at least in the case of social status. Overall, this confirms that individuals 
are extremely sensitive to signals of social status and process them efficiently. 
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Experiment 2/B was aimed to further explore the temporal dynamics underlying the 
modulation of social status on social attention. 
 
Experiment 2/B 
 
In Experiment 1, another important aspect that had not been addressed is 
related to the temporal persistence of the modulation of social attention as a function 
of social status. In Experiment 2/B, I addressed this issue by keeping the duration of 
the direct-gaze face frame constant at 900 ms, and manipulating the duration of SOA, 
that could be either 200 or 1000 ms. In so doing, the former case was a replication of 
Experiment 1 temporal parameters. As for the latter case, on the one hand, one may 
predict social status to exert its influence upon gaze cuing only at the short SOA, in 
that social status information is not relevant for performing the gaze-cuing task, and 
hence modulations related to differences in social status may disappear. On the other 
hand, finding a modulation of social attention processes at both the short and the long 
SOA would cast evidence about the persistent nature of the effects of social status 
even when this variable is not directly relevant for the task at hand. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Seventy-six undergraduates (Mean age = 23.8 years, SD = 4.9, 26 males) took 
part in the experiment on a voluntary basis. None of them had taken part in the 
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previous experiment. All were naive as to the purpose of the study and reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The local ethic committee approved the study. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2/A, with 
the following exceptions: the duration of the direct-gaze face frame was held constant 
at 900 ms (see Figure 5), and two SOAs of 200 ms and 1000 ms were used. 
 
Results 
 
I used the same data reduction rationale as in Experiment 1. Participants who 
committed at least 1 error during the manipulation check (N = 19) and with a 
percentage of errors during the experimental phase that fell 2 SD above the mean (N = 
4) were excluded from the analyses. Then, incorrect responses were removed and 
analysed separately (2.09% of the total trials). A repeated-measures ANOVA was 
performed on median RTs with Cue-target spatial congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent), SOA (200 ms vs. 1000 ms) and Status (high vs. low) as within-
participants factors. The main effect of Cue-target spatial congruency was significant, 
F(1,52) = 24.777, p < .001, η2p = .323, owing to smaller RTs on congruent (M = 533 
ms, SE = 9.1) than on incongruent trials (M = 544 ms, SE = 9.5), as well as the main 
effect of SOA, F(1,52) = 35.192, p < .001, η2p = .404, owing to smaller RTs at the 
longer (M = 529 ms, SE = 9.3) than at the shorter (M = 547 ms, SE = 9.4) SOA. The 
Cue-target spatial congruency × SOA interaction was also significant, F(1,52) = 
8.343, p = .006, η2p = .138. Paired comparisons between congruent and incongruent 
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trials divided by SOA revealed that the cuing effect was significant both at the 
shorter, t(52) = 2.327, p = .024, and at the longer, t(52) = 4.669, p < .001, SOA, but 
the effect was larger in the latter case (5 ms vs. 18 ms). The two-way Cue-target 
spatial congruency × Status interaction did not yield a significant effect (p = .209), 
whereas the three-way Cue-target spatial congruency × SOA × Status interaction was 
statistically significant, F(1,52) = 4.551, p = .038, η2p = .080. Paired comparisons 
between congruent and incongruent trials divided by SOA and status revealed that the 
cuing effect was significant for high-status faces both at the shorter, t(52) = 2.5309, p 
= .01444, and at the longer SOA, t(52) = 2.5314, p = .01442, and also for the low-
status faces but only at the longer SOA, t(52) = 5.72, p < .001. At the shorter SOA, 
the cuing effect for low status faces was not significant, t(52) = .921, p = .361 (see 
Table 1). No other main effects or interactions emerged (ps >.331). 
A second repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of 
errors with the same factors as above. The main effect of Cue-target spatial 
congruency was significant, F(1,52) = 7.083, p = .010, η2p = .12, owing to more errors 
on incongruent (M = 2.4 %, SE = .26) than on congruent (M = 1.8 %, SE = .2) trials. 
The main effect of SOA approached significance, F(1,52) = 3.943, p = .052, η2p = .07, 
reflecting more errors at the shorter (M = 2.4 %, SE = .26) than at the longer (M = 1.8 
%, SE = .24) SOA, as well the main effect of Status, F(1,52) = 3.487, p = .067, η2p = 
.063, reflecting more errors in response to high- (M = 2.3 %, SE = .25) than to low-
status (M = 1.8 %, SE = .23) faces. No other main effects or interactions emerged (ps 
> .538). Thus, no speed-accuracy trade-off affected the data. 
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Table 1. Median RTs (ms) and percentage of errors (%) for each condition in Experiment 1 and 2. Values in brackets are SEM. 
C = congruent trials; I = incongruent trials. 
 
 EXPERIMENT 1  EXPERIMENT 2 
 Direct-gaze face duration 
50-ms 
 
Direct-gaze face duration 
900-ms 
 
Averted-gaze face duration 
200-ms SOA 
 
Averted-gaze face duration 
1000-ms SOA 
 High Status Low Status  High Status Low Status  High Status Low Status  High Status Low Status 
 C I C I  C I C I  C I C I  C I C I 
RTs 
520 
(7) 
534 
(8) 
523 
(8) 
528 
(7) 
 
515 
(8) 
531 
(8) 
520 
(8) 
527 
 (8) 
 
543 
(10) 
550 
(10) 
546 
(10) 
550 
(9) 
 
523 
(9) 
535 
(10) 
518 
(9) 
542  
(10) 
% E 
2.4 
(.38) 
1.7 
(.29) 
1.9 
(.34) 
2  
(.27) 
 
2.1 
(.36) 
2.4 
(.48) 
3 
 (.4) 
2.3 
 (.37) 
 
2.3 
 (.4) 
2.8  
(.4) 
1.9 
(.37) 
2.5 
(.41) 
 
1.9 
(.3) 
2.4 
(.47) 
1.1 
(.24) 
1.9 
 (.39) 
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Discussion 
 
In line with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2/A, in Experiment 2/B a reliable 
gaze-cuing effect emerged in response to the averted gaze of high- but not low-status 
individuals at the shorter SOA, whereas at the longer SOA a reliable gaze-cuing effect 
emerged irrespective of the social status of the faces. This pattern of results suggests 
that the tendency to selectively attend to the locations gazed by high-status individuals 
decays with time. 
In sum, the results of Experiment 2/A and 2/B show that social status 
information can rapidly be extracted from faces on the basis of previous episodic 
learning and that differences in gaze cuing as a function of social status disappear 
with time. 
Future studies may provide further insight about the temporal dynamics 
underlying the modulation of social attention as a function of social status by 
combining behavioural and high-temporal resolution electrophysiological measures. 
This may also help understanding how the neural bases of the interplay between 
social status and social attention processes. 
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2.2. Study 2 
The politics of attention (contextualized) 
 
Carraro*, L., Dalmaso*, M., Castelli, L., & Galfano, G. (Submitted). The politics of 
attention contextualized: Gaze but not arrow cuing of attention is moderated 
by political temperament. 
 
* The first two authors contributed equally, with first authorship being determined by a coin toss. 
 
Dodd et al. (2011) have recently reported that even political temperament, like 
social status, can modulate gaze cuing of attention. In their study, they first measured 
political orientation by asking participants to indicate their standing in relation to a 
series of sensitive social issues. Next, they administered a standard gaze-cuing task 
with three SOA between cue and target onset and found a reliable gaze-cuing effect 
among liberals but not among conservatives. According to Dodd et al. (2011), this 
may be consistent with the idea that conservatives, as compared to liberals, assign 
greater value to personal autonomy and therefore might be less likely to be influenced 
by others. However, the pattern reported by Dodd et al. (2011) might not be confined 
to gaze cues and, instead, reflect a reduced attentional response to any central cue that 
“pushes” spatial attention. In other words, conservatives might prove to be less 
sensitive to any cue that is interpreted as an external drive. In order to explore this 
latter hypothesis, I conducted a first experiment (Experiment 1) in which I used the 
procedure employed by Dodd et al. (2011), and examined attention shifting in both 
conservatives and liberals by comparing gaze and arrow cues. Similar to gaze, arrow 
cues have been shown to elicit reflexive shifts of attention and are often used as a 
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useful term of comparison for assessing the relative impact of social and symbolic 
cues (e.g., Bayliss et al., 2005; Bayliss & Tipper, 2005; Galfano et al., 2012; Kuhn & 
Benson, 2007; Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009; Kuhn et al., 2011; Tipples, 2002, 2008). 
Subsequently, I carried out a second experiment (Experiment 2) in order to increase to 
ecological validity of the present research by using photographs of real individuals as 
face stimuli.  
 
Experiment 1 
 
The first goal of the present study was to provide further empirical evidence 
supporting the results reported by Dodd et al. (2011), namely, the presence of a 
reliable gaze-cuing effect among liberals but not among conservatives. Importantly, 
because the current study was conducted in a different country, consistent evidence 
would speak in favour of the generalizability of the findings in different social 
contexts. The second goal of this study was assessing the extent to which the absence 
of cuing effect exhibited by conservatives is specific to gaze cues, or extends to 
symbolic cues such as arrows. Because I used an additional cue, unlike Dodd et al. 
(2011), I only included two SOAs in order to simplify the experimental design.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Sixty-eight undergraduate students (Mean age = 20.1 years, SD = 5.32, 13 
males) at the University of Padova took part in the study in exchange for course 
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credits. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve to the 
purpose of the experiment. The local ethic committee approved the study. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Questionnaire on political ideology 
 
Political ideology was assessed separately from the main study through an 
online survey (www.surveymonkey.com), as part of a mass testing at the beginning of 
the semester. Participants were asked to express their level of agreement (from 1 = 
“not at all” to 7 = “very much”) towards 8 social issues (i.e., reduction of 
immigration, abortion, medically assisted procreation, homosexual marriage, 
legalization of soft drugs, euthanasia, use of stem cells, adoption by homosexual 
couples; α = .74). This scale has been already widely used in previous research (e.g., 
Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011; Castelli & Carraro, 2011). 
 
Spatial cueing task 
 
Gaze and arrow stimuli were used as cues in two distinct blocks that were 
selected in a random order. I have chosen to present the different cues in separate 
blocks because it has been shown that gaze cuing can be sensitive to contextual 
factors such as the presence of other cuing stimuli within the same block of trials 
(Pavan et al., 2011). In the gaze-cue block, the cue was very similar to that used by 
Dodd et al. (2011), namely a schematic face (6° of diameter) with gaze pointing either 
rightwards or leftwards. In the arrow-cue block, the cue was an arrow (3.8° × 1.6°) 
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pointing either rightwards or leftwards. The arrow appeared with a symmetric head 
and tale in order to be comparable to the two eyes conveying directional information 
(see also Galfano et al., 2012). A PC running E-prime 1.1 handled stimulus 
presentation and data collection. Participants sat approximately 57 cm from a 17-inch 
monitor (1024 × 768 pixel, 60 Hz) on which stimuli were presented in white against a 
black background. 
The procedure was similar to that used by Dodd et al. (2011). Each trial began 
with a fixation cross (1°) presented in the centre of the screen for 250 ms. In the face-
cue block, a face without pupils was shown for 750 ms and then replaced with the 
same face with gaze pointing rightwards or leftwards. After either 200 or 700 ms, 
depending on SOA, a white-dot target (1°) appeared 2.5° to the right or to the left of 
the cue. In the arrow-cue block, fixation was followed by the arrow-cue without head 
and tale (i.e., a horizontal line segment). Afterwards the same arrow with head and 
tale both pointing rightwards or leftwards appeared. Timing parameters were the same 
in the face-cue and arrow-cue blocks. Participants were instructed to maintain fixation 
at the centre of the screen and to press the space bar as fast as possible when the target 
appeared (target present trial), and to refrain from responding if the target did not 
appear (catch trial). They were explicitly instructed that cue direction was 
uninformative with respect to target location. Catch trials were used in order to avoid 
anticipations. The red words “NO RESPONSE” or “ERROR” were presented when 
participants failed to respond within 2000 ms (i.e., omissions) or responded on catch 
trials (i.e., false alarms), respectively. Finally, a blank screen appeared for 500 ms 
(see Figure 7). Then, the next trial began. Each experimental block was composed of 
160 target present trials and 40 catch trials and it was preceded by a practice block 
composed of 8 target present trials and 2 catch trials. Target present trials and catch 
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trials were presented in a random order. There were potentially 40 data points for each 
condition defined by cue-target spatial congruency, cue type and SOA. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Examples of an arrow-cue congruent trial (A) and a gaze-cue incongruent trial (B). 
 
Results 
 
False alarms were extremely low (.08% of trials) and were removed. Missed 
responses (.02% of trials) and outliers, defined as trials for which RTs were 2 SDs 
above or below the mean of each participant divided by condition (3.8% of trials), 
were also removed. Due to the low rate of errors, these were not analysed further. 
First, we classified participants as either conservatives or liberals on the basis 
of their responses to the questionnaire. Responses to the questionnaire were rescaled 
so that higher scores corresponded to more conservative views (Mean of the 
experimental sample = 3.52, SD = 1.18; range from 1.14 to 6.00). The median value 
was 3.57, a score reported by three participants. The split half thus resulted in groups 
with different size (35 liberals and 33 conservatives; 7 and 6 males, respectively). 
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Mean RTs for correct responses were submitted to a mixed-design repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Cue-target spatial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), Cue type 
(arrow vs. gaze) and SOA (200 vs. 700 ms) as within-participants factors, and with 
Political ideology (liberal vs. conservative) as between-participants factor. The main 
effect of Cue-target spatial congruency was significant, F(1,66) = 90.301, p < .001, 
η2p = .578, owing to shorter RTs on congruent (M = 321 ms, SE = 5.30) than on 
incongruent (M = 329 ms, SE = 5.55) trials. The main effect of SOA was also 
significant, F(1,66) = 150.315, p < .001, η2p = .695, owing to shorter RTs on longer 
(M = 312 ms, SE = 5.51) than on shorter (M = 338 ms, SE = 5.53) SOA. In addition, 
the Cue-target spatial congruency × Cue type interaction was significant, F(1,66) = 
7.342, p = .009, η2p = .100, a pattern that was further qualified by the four-way cue-
target spatial Congruency × Cue type × SOA × Political ideology interaction, F(1,66) 
= 4.087, p = .047, η2p = .058. 
In order to clarify this interaction, RT data of conservatives and liberals were 
submitted to two separate mixed-design repeated-measures ANOVAs with the same 
within-participants factors as earlier. 
As for liberals, the main effect of cue-target spatial congruency was 
significant, F(1,34) = 41.135, p < .001, η2p = .547, owing to shorter RTs on congruent 
(M = 323 ms, SE = 7.05) than on incongruent (M = 331 ms, SE = 7.20) trials. The 
main effect of SOA was also significant, F(1,34) = 70.363, p < .001, η2p = .674, 
owing to shorter RTs on longer (M = 312 ms, SE = 6.99) than on shorter (M = 342 ms, 
SE = 7.61) SOA. No other main effect or interaction emerged. For the sake of 
completeness, two-tailed paired-samples t-tests confirmed that, regardless of SOA, 
liberals shifted their attention in response to both arrow and gaze (all ps < .007; 
Figure 8). 
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As for conservatives, the main effect of Cue-target spatial congruency was 
significant, F(1,32) = 50.531, p < .001, η2p = .612, owing to shorter RTs on congruent 
(M = 320 ms, SE = 7.97) than on incongruent (M = 328 ms, SE = 8.52) trials. The 
main effect of SOA was also significant, F(1,32) = 94.961, p < .001, η2p = .748, 
owing to shorter RTs on longer (M = 312 ms, SE = 8.59) than on shorter (M = 335 ms, 
SE = 8.03) SOA. Crucially, the two-way Cue-target spatial congruency × Cue type 
interaction was also significant, F(1,32) = 11.448, p = .002, η2p = .263, reflecting the 
fact that conservatives were much more sensitive to arrow cues (congruent trials: M = 
316 ms, SE = 7.85; incongruent trials: M = 327 ms, SE = 8.47) than to gaze cues 
(congruent trials: M = 322 ms, SE = 8.50; incongruent trials: M = 328 ms, SE = 8.87). 
The three-way Cue-target spatial congruency × Cue type × SOA interaction was also 
significant, F(1,32) = 7.025, p = .012, η2p = .180. Two-tailed paired-samples t-tests 
comparing congruent and incongruent trials at each SOA divided by cue indicated that 
at the shorter SOA conservatives shifted their attention in response to both arrow, 
t(32) = 4.974 p < .001, and gaze, t(32) = 4.547, p < .001, whereas at the longer SOA 
they shifted their attention in response to arrow, t(32) = 5.652, p < .001, but not in 
response to gaze, t(32) = .947, p = .351. 
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Figure 8. Mean RTs for congruent and incongruent trials as a function of cue type and SOA 
divided for liberals and conservatives. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Asterisks denote 
t-test p < 0.05. NS = not significant. 
 
Furthermore, because the two groups of liberals and conservatives differed in 
size, I tried to test whether the assignment of the three respondents with the median 
score to the ideology questionnaire to the group of liberals might have somehow 
affected the results. To this aim, a further mixed-design repeated-measures ANOVA 
with Cue-target spatial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), Cue type (arrow vs. 
gaze), SOA (200 vs. 700 ms), and Political ideology (liberal vs. conservative) was 
conducted on mean RTs after classifying the three respondents as conservatives. 
Importantly, the four-way Cue-target spatial congruency × cue type × SOA × Political 
ideology interaction was still significant, F(1,66) = 5.008, p = .029, η2p = .071. This 
pattern suggests that assigning respondents scoring around the median value to one 
group rather than the other did not affect the results. 
In addition, in order to clarify the robustness of the observed pattern, I also 
adopted a different strategy by considering ideology as a continuous variable. To this 
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end, mean RTs were submitted to an ANCOVA with Cue-target spatial congruency, 
Cue, and SOA as within-participants factors, and political ideology as covariate. 
Critically, the four-way Cue-target spatial congruency × Cue type × SOA × Political 
ideology interaction was statistically significant, F(1,66) = 4.364, p = .041, η2p = .062. 
 
Discussion 
 
During the last decade, research has shown important differences between 
people who support different political opinions. Indeed, conservatives and liberals not 
only have divergent ideas about social and economical issues but, interestingly, they 
display more profound cognitive differences (e.g., Carraro et al., 2011; Castelli & 
Carraro, 2011; Dodd et al., 2012; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Oxley et al., 2008). For 
instance, as compared to liberals, conservatives show increased alertness responses to 
sudden events (Oxley et al., 2008) and their attention is more strongly grabbed by 
negative stimuli (Carraro et al., 2011). Dodd et al. (2011) showed that conservatives 
and liberals seem to differ also with regard to another important aspect, namely, their 
attentional response to gaze. In particular, a consistent gaze-cuing effect was observed 
in liberals but not in conservatives. 
The present findings add to an increasing literature suggesting that political 
temperament and affiliation can modulate attention towards social stimuli. The goal of 
Experiment 1 was twofold. Firstly, I wanted to address whether the pattern reported 
by Dodd et al. (2011) extended to a different social context. The second aim was to 
determine whether the lack of gaze cuing reported by Dodd et al. (2011) was 
suggestive of a general reduced response towards central cues or a gaze-specific 
phenomenon. To this purpose I included also arrows, that is central cues that are 
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known to be very effective in pushing attention and are often used as a term of 
comparison for eye gaze (e.g., Bayliss et al., 2005; Galfano et al., 2012; Kuhn & 
Kingstone, 2009; Tipples, 2002). 
As for liberals, I found a generalized cuing effect for both gaze and arrow 
cues. In sharp contrast, conservatives showed a stronger cuing effect for arrows than 
for gaze cues. This pattern is important in that it shows that the reduced attentional 
response exhibited by conservatives is specific for gaze stimuli. In addition, the 
present results suggest that the pattern reported by Dodd et al. (2011) extends to a 
different social context. Unlike Dodd et al. (2011), however, the magnitude of gaze 
cuing for conservatives was further modulated by SOA. Indeed, gaze cuing was 
absent at the 700-ms SOA only. This discrepancy with respect to Dodd et al. (2011)’s 
results was unexpected. If any, this finding seems to suggest that individual 
differences took some time to exert their influence, at least in my sample. Future 
research will have to include a more dense and broader range of SOAs aimed at 
clarifying the temporal dynamics underlying the impact of political temperament on 
gaze cuing. 
The observed dissociation between gaze cuing and arrow cuing in 
conservative people is theoretically relevant in that it allows to disentangle between 
different potential explanations. Indeed, the present findings do not support the view 
that conservatives have a generalized diminished tendency to follow central cues that 
“push” attention. In contrast my results are more in line with the idea that 
conservatives are specifically less responsive to stimuli acting as social external 
drives. This interpretation is consistent with the theoretical frame provided by Dodd et 
al. (2011), who suggested that conservatives are typically more individualistic and, 
therefore, they may be less prone to being influenced by others. 
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To conclude, results of Experiment 1 confirmed the presence of a reduced 
cuing effect in response to gaze but not in response to arrow cues among 
conservatives, whereas liberals showed a reliable cuing effect regardless of cue type. 
This is in line with and extends what observed by Dodd et al. (2011). Experiment 2 
was carried out to replicate these findings by using stimuli more ecologically valid. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
In Study 1 we replicated the main result reported by Dodd et al. (2011), 
namely a reduced gaze-cueing effect, in the face of a spared arrow-cueing effect, 
among conservatives but not among liberals. Aim of the Study 2 was to replicate this 
pattern of results by presenting participants only with photographs of real individuals, 
in order to increase the ecological validity of the results. In fact, both in Dodd et al. 
(2011) and in Experiment 1, participants were presented with a schematic face, 
namely a particularly impoverished social cue which did not reflects the complexity 
of a stimulus such as of human face. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Thirty-three undergraduate students (Mean age = 20.06 years, SD = 5.402, 7 
males) at the University of Padova took part in the study in exchange for course 
credits. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve to the 
purpose of the experiment. The local ethic committee approved the study. 
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Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Questionnaire on political ideology 
 
The questionnaire used to assess the political ideology of participants was the 
same used in Study 1. 
 
Gaze-cueing task 
 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1. Two faces depicting 
older adults were extracted from the same set of stimuli as that used in Study 1 
(00739_941201_fb, 00950_960627_fa). Stimuli were presented on a black 
background. Each trial began with the presentation of a white fixation cross (0.82°) in 
the centre of the screen for 900 ms (Fixation frame, Figure 9), followed by a central 
face (21.2° height × 14° width) with direct gaze (Face frame). After 900 ms, the same 
face appeared with averted gaze (cue frame). After 200 ms, a white target letter (L or 
T, 0.828) appeared 11° to the left or right of the centre of the screen in one of two 
possible locations: spatially congruent or incongruent with gaze direction. The target 
frame remained visible until a response was provided. Gaze direction was 
uninformative as regards target location and participants were instructed to maintain 
fixation at the centre of the screen. Instructions emphasized both response speed and 
accuracy. Participants responded using their right and left index fingers. Half of the 
participants were instructed to press the ‘K’ key of a standard keyboard if the target 
was an ‘L’, and the ‘D’ key if the target was a ‘T’. The remaining participants 
responded using the opposite map- ping. In the case of a wrong response, the text 
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‘ERROR’ appeared in white centred on the screen for 500 ms. There was a practice 
block composed by 10 trials followed by and experimental block composed by 192 
trials. The whole procedure took about 20 minutes. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Illustration of stimuli (not drawn to scale) and sequence of events for a spatially 
congruent trial (A) and a spatially incongruent trial (B). 
 
Results 
 
I discarded from analysis 2 participants because they did not respond to the 
questionnaire and other 2 participants because they committed more than 15 % of 
errors, leaving my sample composed by 29 individuals. Trials in which participants 
committed an error (4.63 % of total trials) and outliers, defined as trials for which RTs 
were 3 SDs above or below the mean of each participant divided by condition (1.65 % 
of total trials) were removed. Errors were analysed separately. 
First, I classified participants as either conservatives or liberals on the basis of 
their responses to the questionnaire. Responses to the questionnaire were rescaled so 
 58 
that higher scores corresponded to more conservative views (Mean of the 
experimental sample = 3.5, SD = .97; range from 1.88 to 5.50). The median value was 
3.5. The split half resulted in 15 (4 males) liberals and 14 (2 males) conservatives. 
Mean RTs for correct responses were submitted to a mixed-design repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Cue-target spatial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-
participants factors, and with Political ideology (liberal vs. conservative) as between-
participants factor. The main effect of Cue-target spatial congruency was significant, 
F(1,27) = 11.356, p = .002, η2p = .296, owing to shorter RTs on Congruent (M = 566 
ms, SE = 14.13) than on Incongruent (M = 575 ms, SE = 14.27) trials. Critically, the 
interaction Cue-target spatial congruency × Political ideology was also significant, 
F(1,27) = 11.356, p = .002, η2p = .296. Two-tailed paired-samples t-tests comparing 
congruent and incongruent trials divided by political ideology revealed that liberals, 
t(14) = 5.428, p < .001, but not conservatives, t(13) = .7671, p = .514, oriented their 
attention in response to gaze cues (Figure 10). 
A second mixed-design repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on the 
percentage of errors with the same factors as earlier excluded the presence of speed-
accuracy trade-off (Fs < 1). 
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Figure 10. Mean RTs for congruent and incongruent trials divided for liberals and 
conservatives. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Asterisk denote t-test p < 0.01. NS = not 
significant. 
 
Discussion 
 
Here I replicated the main result observed in the previous experiment, namely 
reduced gaze-cueing effect in conservatives but not in liberals. It is worth to notice 
that here I presented participants with photographs of real individuals, approaching 
closer what really happens during social interactions. Interestingly, recent evidence 
shown that when faces of real politicians are used as cues, conservatives and liberals 
are less influenced by gaze direction of their respective outgroup leaders (Liuzza et 
al., 2011, 2013). Taken together, all these evidence strongly emphasize the 
importance of political variables in shaping social attention. Future work is planned to 
address the question of whether conservatives still show an impaired cuing effect also 
when other social cues (e.g., pointing gestures, head turns, etc.), that are known to 
produce robust attention shifts (e.g., Cazzato, Macaluso, Crostella, & Aglioti, 2012; 
Langton & Bruce, 2000), are used. Any additional evidence in this regard would 
further clarify how the different views about the world hold by conservatives and 
liberals also reflect into different social attention mechanisms. 
500
550
600
650
Congruent
Incongruent
LIBERALS CONSERVATIVES
* NS
R
T 
(m
s)
 60 
2.3. Study 3 
I know that gaze! Effects of implicit social learning on gaze cueing 
 
Dalmaso, M., Edwards, S. G., & Bayliss, A. P. (In preparation). I know that gaze! 
Effects of implicit social learning on gaze cueing. 
 
 
In literature, the vast of the majority of the studies that investigated gaze-
mediated orienting participants were presented with faces that they had never seen 
before. This means that the critical modulation was achieved by varying the physical 
features of the facial stimuli. For instance, as discussed also in the introductory part of 
this chapter, an enhanced gaze-cueing effect has been observed in response to faces 
that depicted fearful expressions (e.g., Kuhn & Tipples, 2011; Tipples, 2006) or faces 
that were characterized by signs of physical dominance (e.g., Jones et al., 2010), 
whereas a decreased gaze-cueing effect emerged for faces that depicted individuals of 
low social status manipulated through racial membership (Pavan et al., 2011). 
However, in every day we tend to re-encounter people we have previously interacted 
with or which we could know aspects related to their identity. Only a few studies 
assessed the role of this non-visual information associated with faces in modulating 
the gaze-cueing effect. For instance, in some studies participants were presented with 
faces of which they already possess a prior knowledge with respect to their identity. 
In this regard, it has been observed that faces of famous (Frischen & Tipper, 2006) or 
familiar (Deaner et al., 2007) individuals produced a grater gaze-cueing effect. On the 
other hand, in other studies the social knowledge related to faces was acquired by 
participants through episodic learning that preceded the gaze-cueing task. In this 
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regard, a greater gaze-cueing effect has been observed for high than for low social 
status faces, when participants were asked to read some fictive CVs associated with 
them (see Study 1). 
In the present study I conducted two experiments to further assess the impact 
of episodic learning on gaze-cueing effect. Unlike previous studies, here I was 
interested in investigate the possible impact on gaze-cueing effect of implicit learning 
of social information regarding gaze behavior. In fact, it is well know that eye gaze 
direction can produce not only shift of attention in an observer, but it also has 
profound influences on basic aspects of person perception. For instance, we judge 
other individuals as more trustworthy and more attractive and we tend to produce a 
stronger memory trace of them, when they make direct eye contact with us (e.g., 
Mason, Hood, & Macrae, 2004; Mason, Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005). Moreover, direct-
gaze faces facilitate some categorical responses such as gender discrimination 
(Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002). However, it is interestingly to note 
that a prolonged exposure to direct gaze can be perceived by an observer as a 
threatening signal which is even able to increase arousal (Argyle & Cook, 1976; 
Nichols & Champness, 1971). More relevant for the present study, it has been 
demonstrated that we tend to evaluate as more trustworthy even faces that consistently 
look towards an object than faces that consistently look towards the opposite direction 
(e.g., Bayliss, Griffiths, & Tipper, 2009; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). This is because, 
embracing an evolutionary prospective, we can become aware of the presence of 
interesting objects in our environment (e.g., a food source, a sex mate, a danger, etc.) 
by using others’ gaze direction. Therefore, we would tend to assign more positive 
traits to a face that always suggests to us the correct location of one of these objects 
rather than to a face that use its gaze to deceive (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). 
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On this basis, I employed a novel paradigm to assess whether faces that, in a 
preliminary oculomotor task, showed a cooperative gaze behavior with participants 
instead of a non-cooperative gaze behaviour, could modulate attentional orienting in a 
subsequent gaze-cueing task. Cooperative or not cooperative gaze behaviour has been 
operationalized in term of Joint Attention (JA). JA is the most commonly used term 
employed to indicate a specific aspect of social attention. In fact, while gaze-cueing of 
attention represents a dyadic interaction involving two individuals, JA refers to a 
triadic interaction involving a kind of abstract triangle formed by two individuals 
whose share their focus of attention on a third element, such as another individual, an 
object or, more simply, a spatial location (e.g., Emery, 2000; Pfeiffer, Vogeley, & 
Schilbach, 2013; Schilbach et al., 2010). More specifically, the whole procedure was 
so composed. Firstly, participants were asked to take part in an implicit episodic 
learning phase. This consisted in a gaze-contingent eye-tracking task in which 
centrally-placed faces could continuously lead, or not, to a state of JA with the 
participant. More specifically, a peripheral instruction cue onset informed participants 
towards which of two spatial positions make an eye movement. This eye movement 
could be directed towards the instruction cue itself (i.e., a saccade) or towards the 
opposite spatial position (i.e., an antisaccade). After that the required eye movement 
was performed, participants and faces eyes could find themselves in a condition in 
which they were fixating towards the same position (i.e., JA) or towards the opposite 
position (i.e., Dis-Joint Attention; D-JA). In Experiment 1, the instruction cue was 
presented after that the central face moved its eyes. In other words, participant’s 
response was subsequent to face’s behaviour, a condition of gaze following. In 
Experiment 2 this relationship was reversed, with the instruction cue that was 
presented before that the central face moved its eyes. So, in this case, face’s behaviour 
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was subsequent to participant’s response, a condition of gaze leading. This second 
condition, in which participant is the initiating member of the JA triad, so far has been 
scarcely investigated. However, some recent studies have highlighted the great 
importance of initiating JA episodes (e.g., Bayliss et al., 2012; Schilbach, 2010). In 
particular, Schilbach et al. (2010) asked participants to move their eyes towards a 
specific part of the screen. After that, a computer-generated avatar could either look 
towards the same spatial location, achieving a state of JA, or towards a different 
spatial location, achieving a state of D-JA. Schilbach and colleagues found that the 
ventral striatum preferentially activated during JA episodes relative to episodes of D-
JA. The ventral striatum has been shown to activate to a wide variety of reward 
scenarios, supporting the idea gaze leading can be considered as a form of social 
reinforcement. Interestingly, Schilbach and colleagues tested also the condition in 
which JA episodes were achieved through gaze following. In this second case, they 
observed an activation of different areas with respect to the gaze leading condition, 
with particular regards to the anterior portion of the medial prefrontal cortex which 
seems to be involved in stimulus oriented attending. 
 Critically, in both experiments of the present study, a group of faces always 
led to a state of JA with the participant whereas the other group of faces never led to a 
state of JA with the participant. Secondly, the same faces were employed in a standard 
gaze-cueing task, identical in both experiments, in which a peripheral target to be 
discriminated could be congruent or incongruent to gaze direction of the central face. 
Importantly, in the gaze-cueing task gaze direction was equally non-predictive of 
target location independently by face’s identity. 
In both experiments, I expected to observe a greater gaze-cueing effect for 
faces that, in the first task, led to a state of JA (i.e., cooperative faces) than in a state 
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of D-JA (i.e., non-cooperative faces) with participants. Furthermore, this question was 
tested using two different SOA (i.e., 200 ms and 1200 ms), in order to explore the 
time course of attention shifting elicited by the two groups of faces, if any. In 
particular, the 200-ms SOA was choose in order to tap into reflexive processes (e.g., 
Müller & Rabbitt, 1989), whereas the 1200-ms SOA should be more suitable to 
observe volitional processes (e.g., Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004; Tipples, 2008). 
 
Experiment 1 
 
In the episodic learning phase of the present experiment, participants were 
asked to make a saccade or an antisaccade after that the central face moved its eyes. 
Faces looked always towards the position of the upcoming onset of the instruction 
cue. In this manner, participant’s response was subsequent to face’s behaviour, a 
condition of gaze following. After the learning phase, participants were asked to 
complete a standard gaze-cueing task in which same faces as previous task was 
employed. In this second task, faces were not predictive with regards to target 
position. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Nineteen students at the University of East Anglia (Mean age = 21 years; SD = 
4.1; 8 males) participated in return for payment (£7) or course credits. All had correct 
 65 
or correct to normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the experiment and gave a 
written consent approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
A PC running E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, USA) 
handled timing and stimulus presentation. A video-based (infrared) eye tracker 
(Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada) recorded right eye position (spatial 
resolution of 0.1°, 500 Hz). Participants placed their head on a chinrest in front of a 
19-inch monitor (1024 × 768 px, 75 Hz). Viewing distance was 65 cm. A standard 
keyboard collected manual response. 
Four smiling faces of white individuals were taken from the NimStim face set 
(Tottenham et al., 2009). Smiling faces were choses because the positive context they 
create appears to encourage learning processes (Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, & Tipper, 
2007; Bayliss et al., 2009; Bayliss, Schuch, & Tipper, 2010). Photos depicted two 
adult males and two of adult females. Each pair of same gender was matched for age 
and attractiveness (see Bayliss et al., 2009; Bayliss et al., 2012). Then, one male and 
one female were allocated to Face Group A whereas the others to Face Group B and 
used in the experimental blocks. An additional smiling face of a white adult male was 
used in the practice blocks. 
 
Task 1: Saccade/antisaccade task 
 
Each trial began with a central black fixation cross (0.8° of side) on a dark 
grey background flanked by two white squared placeholders (1° of side) with black 
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contours (0.2° width) placed 9.8° rightwards and leftwards from the cross. 
Participants were asked to fixate on the cross and press the space bar once they had 
achieved fixation. This procedure ensured that participants fixated the centre of the 
screen and allowed us to perform a drift correction. 600 ms after the key press, the 
fixation cross was replaced by a central face with direct gaze (11° height × 8° width) 
for 1500 ms, followed by the same face with averted gaze rightwards or leftwards. 
After 200 or 1200 ms, depending on SOA, the white area of the gazed placeholder 
turned green or red (instruction cue). Participants were instructed to move their eyes 
towards the placeholder if it turned green (i.e., a saccade), or to move their eyes 
towards the opposite placeholder if it turned red (i.e., an antisaccade). A trial ended 
after that participants maintained their eyes on the correct placeholder for 500 ms, 
assessed by a gaze-contingent trigger (see Figure 11, Panel A).  
The instruction cue was always appeared at the location to which the face 
looked – in other words it was spatially congruent to the gaze direction of the central 
face. For half of the participants, faces belonging to Face Group A always appeared 
on ‘saccade’ trials. So, they always looked towards the same placeholder (green) that 
participant was required to look at, whereas faces belonging to Face Group B always 
appeared on ‘antisaccade’ trials. So, they always looked towards the opposite 
placeholder (red) that participant was asked to look at. In this way, one set of faces 
always led to a state of JA with the participants, while the other faces never engaged 
in JA with the participant. For the other half of the participants, the type of trial 
associated with each face was reversed. 
Participants were instructed to move their eyes as quickly and as accurately as 
possible and to ignore faces and gaze direction. There were 16 practice trials followed 
by 240 experimental trials divided in three blocks of 80 trials each in which all the 
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experimental conditions, each of them composed by an equal number of trials, were 
chosen randomly. A 5-point calibration was conducted at the beginning of each block. 
At the end of the task a brief break was granted. 
 
Task 2: Gaze-cueing task 
 
Each trial began with a central black fixation cross (0.8° of side) on a dark 
grey background flanked by two white squared placeholders (1° of side) with black 
contours (0.2° width) placed 9.8° rightwards and leftwards from the cross. 600 ms 
after, the fixation cross was replaced by a central face with direct gaze for 1500 ms, 
followed by the same face with averted gaze rightwards or leftwards. The faces were 
the same as those in Task 1. After 200 or 1200 ms, depending on SOA, a black target 
line (1° height × 0.2° width) appeared centrally-placed inside one of the placeholders 
(see Figure 11, Panel C). The inclination of the target line could be vertical or 
horizontal. Half of the participants were instructed to press the ‘H’ key with the 
middle finder of their dominant hand in case the line was vertical, and the space bar 
with the index finger of their dominant hand in case the line was horizontal. The other 
half of the participants responded using the opposite mapping between key and target 
latter. Either face and target line remained visible until the participant responded or 
3000 ms were elapsed, whichever came first. The centrally-placed red words 
‘ERROR’ or ‘NO RESPONSE’ replaced the central face for 500 ms in the case of a 
wrong or a missing response, respectively. 
Contrary to Task 1, now the participants were instructed to maintain their eyes 
at the centre of the screen. Moreover, although in the Task 1 there was a clear 
mapping between face identity and trial type, there was no such mapping here. In fact, 
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all faces could be valid or invalid equally often with respect to target position – in 
other words the target line, independently by its inclination, was spatially congruent 
or incongruent to gaze direction of the central face with the same probability. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible 
and to ignore the faces and their gaze direction. There were 10 practice trials followed 
by 256 experimental trials in which the all the experimental conditions, each of them 
composed by an equal number of trials, were chosen randomly. A 5-point calibration 
was conducted at the beginning of the practice block. The whole Experiment (Task 1 
and Task 2) lasted about 1 hour. 
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Figure 11. Panel A: Stimuli, trial sequence and timing of the saccade/antisaccade task (Task 
1) used in Experiment 1. An example of JA is depicted, in which participant, who is asked to make a 
saccade (green instruction cue), and the central face look towards the same placeholder. Panel B: 
Stimuli, trial sequence and timing of the saccade/antisaccade task (Task 1) used in Experiment 2. An 
example of D-JA is depicted, in which participant, who is asked to make an antisaccade (red instruction 
cue), and the central face look towards different placeholders. Panel C: Stimuli, trial sequence and 
timing of the gaze-cueing task (Task 2) common to all the experiments. An example of an incongruent 
trial is depicted, in which a vertical target line appears in the opposite placeholder with respect to the 
placeholder gazed by the central face. Schematic eyes below each picture frame represent the correct 
eye movement requested to participants during the saccade/antisaccade task (Panel A and B) whereas 
in the gaze-cueing task participants were asked to maintain their eyes at the centre of the screen (Panel 
C). Stimuli are not drawn to scale. 
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Results 
 
Task 1: Saccade/antisaccade task 
 
Data from the first two participants were lost due to technical problems, 
leaving a sample of 17 participants (Mean age = 21 years; SD = 4.3; 7 males). Eye 
movement onset latency was defined as the time that elapsed from the instruction cue 
(colour change of the placeholder) to the initiation of the first saccade. The first 
saccade was defined as the first eye movement with a velocity exceeding 35°/sec and 
an acceleration exceeding 9500°/sec2. Only saccades with a minimum amplitude of 1° 
were analysed (for a similar procedure, see Kuhn & Tipples, 2011). 
Trials containing blinks (0.7 %) were removed. Errors, namely trials in which 
the first saccade was in the opposite direction according to the instruction cue 
(8.56%), were excluded from calculation of saccadic Reaction Times (sRTs) and 
analysed separately. Outliers, defined as trials in which sRTs exceeded 3SD above 
and below participant’s mean (1.14 %) were also discarded. 
The percentages of errors for each participant in each condition were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Task (antisaccade vs. saccade) 
and SOA (200 ms vs. 1200 ms) as within-subjects factors. The main effect of Task 
was significant, F(1,16) = 11.060, p = .004, η2p = .409, owing to less errors for the 
saccade (M = 5.4 %, SD = 4.1) than for the antisaccade (M = 11.6 %, SD = 9.5) 
movements, whereas the main effect of SOA approached statistical significance, 
F(1,16) = 4.130, p = .059, η2p = .205, reflecting fewer errors at the longer (M = 7.5 %, 
SD = 6.5) than at the shorter (M = 9.5 %, SD = 6.4) SOA. The interaction Task × SOA 
was also significant, F(1,16) = 10.333, p = .005, η2p = .329. Paired comparison 
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between antisaccade and saccade movements for each SOA revealed that the 
percentage of errors was smaller for the saccade than for the antisaccade movements 
at the shorter, t(16)= 3.846, p = .001, but not at the longer, t(16)= .070, p = .945, 
SOA. 
A second ANOVA was conducted on mean sRTs with the same factors 
considered for the analysis of the errors. The main effect of Task was significant, 
F(1,16) = 4.941, p = .041, η2p = .236, owing to smaller sRTs for the saccade (M = 267 
ms, SD = 36.2) than for the antisaccade (M = 282 ms, SD = 45.8) movements, 
whereas the main effect of SOA did not reach statistical significance (p = .135). The 
Task × SOA interaction was significant, F(1,16) = 6. 484, p = .022, η2p = .288. Paired 
comparison between antisaccade and saccade movements for each SOA revealed that 
sRTs were smaller for the saccade than for the antisaccade movements at the shorter, 
t(16)= 3.142, p = .006, (25 ms), but not at the longer, t(16)= .660, p = .519, (5 ms), 
SOA. 
Taken together, these results showed that the oculomotor task required to 
participants varied in the degree of difficulty. In particular, perform a saccade 
movement was easier than perform an antisaccade movement, as reported also in 
previously studies (e.g., Wolohan & Crawford, 2012). This is what exactly I expected 
to happen, since that a saccade is an eye movement towards the same location 
occupied by a target, whereas an antisaccade movement requires more cognitive effort 
in order to localize the position of the target and to program the consequent eye 
movement towards the opposite spatial location. More interestingly, in the present 
task saccade and antisaccade movements were always associated with two distinct 
sets of faces. So, in case participants learned this association, this could be reflected in 
the subsequent gaze cueing task, in which same faces were used. 
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Task 2: Gaze-cueing task 
 
Errors (5.24 % of trials) and outliers, defined as trials in which RTs were 3 SD 
above or below participant’s mean (1.79 % of trials), were discarded from manual RT 
analysis. 
The mean error percentages for each participant in each condition were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Cue-target spatial 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), SOA (200 ms vs. 1200 ms) and Type of face 
(D-JA face vs. JA face) as within-subjects factors. No main effects or interactions 
emerged (ps > .185). 
A second ANOVA was conducted on mean RT with the same factors 
considered for the analysis of the errors. The main effect of Cue-target spatial 
congruency was significant, F(1,18) = 18.498, p < .001, η2p = .507, owing to smaller 
RTs on congruent (M = 651 ms; SD = 101.7) than on incongruent (M = 670 ms; SD = 
109) trials, as well as the main effect of SOA, F(1,18) = 5.884, p = .026, η2p = .246, 
owing to smaller RTs on longer (M = 651 ms; SD = 103.6) than on shorter (M = 670 
ms; SD = 109.1) SOA. Neither the main effect of Type of face nor any two-ways 
interactions were significant (ps > .355). Critically, also the triple interaction Cue-
target congruency × SOA × Type of face was significant, F(1,18) = 9.112, p = .007, 
η2p = .336. Paired comparison between congruent and incongruent trials for each type 
of face and SOA revealed that participants shifted their attention in response to D-JA 
faces at the longer, t(18) = 4.031, p < .001, but not at the shorter, t(18) = .351, p = .73, 
SOA. On trials in which they viewed a face that had – in Task 1 – engaged them in 
JA, the reverse pattern emerged. These faces produced reliable gaze cueing at the 
 73 
shorter, t(18) = 3.657, p = .002, but not at the longer, t(18) = .669, p = .512, SOA (see 
Figure 2). 
Data of all participants were considered for this analysis. However, since the 
first two participants completed the saccade/antisaccade task but I lost their data from 
this task due to technical problems, for completeness I further analysed gaze-cueing 
data excluding these two participants. Results remained unchanged. Errors analysis 
showed that neither main effects nor interactions approached statistical significance 
(all ps > .213). With regards to RT analysis, the main effects of cue-target spatial 
congruency (F(1,16) = 15.882, p = .001, η2p = .498) and SOA (F(1,16) = 5.126, p = 
.038, η2p = .243) were significant, as well as the triple interactions cue-target spatial 
congruency × SOA × type of face (F(1,16) = 14.826, p = .001, η2p = .481). Paired 
comparisons confirmed that participants oriented their attention in response to D-JA 
faces at the longer, t(16) = 4.585, p < .001, but not at the shorter, t(16) = .283, p = 
.781, SOA, and in response to JA faces at the shorter, t(16) = 3.613, p = .002, but not 
at the longer, t(16) = .326, p = .749, SOA. 
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Figure 12. Mean RTs for the gaze-cueing task (Task 2) divided by type of face and SOA in 
Experiment 1 and 2. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Double asterisk denote p < .01. 
NS = not significant. 
 
Discussion  
 
Recent evidence showed that faces that show a “cooperative” gaze behaviour 
are judged as more trustworthy than faces that act in a non-cooperative way (e.g., 
Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). Based on this evidence, here I have investigated whether 
faces that, in an oculomotor task, continuously led to a state of JA (i.e., cooperative 
faces) with participants, could even produce a greater orienting with respect to faces 
that continuously led to a state of D-JA (i.e., non-cooperative faces), when employed 
in a subsequent gaze-cueing task. At the 200-ms SOA, this hypothesis has been 
clearly confirmed, since a reliable gaze-cueing effect emerged in response to JA faces 
but not in response to D-JA faces. Interestingly, an inverted pattern emerged at the 
 75 
1200-ms SOA, with a reliable gaze-cueing effect that emerged in response to D-JA 
faces but not in response to JA faces. This latter result was unexpected. A possible 
explanation could be found considering the different levels of expectations which 
participants have associated with each group of faces. In the case of JA faces, the 
expectation that these cues might gazed towards the upcoming target should be 
particularly high, promoting the tendency to reflexive follow their gaze as confirmed 
at the 200-ms SOA. However, in the case the onset of the target is delayed, as for the 
1200-ms SOA, these faces would lose their reliability, and the volitional processes 
that should emerge at this longer SOA would favour the tendency to ignore their gaze 
direction. Analogously, in the case of D-JA faces, the expectation that these cues 
might gazed towards the upcoming target should be particularly low and participant 
would automatically tend to ignore their gaze, as confirmed by lack of gaze-cueing 
effect observed at the 200-ms SOA. Nevertheless, after a certain period of time, these 
faces would acquire reliability, as confirmed by the gaze-cueing effect observed at the 
1200-ms. 
Taken together, these results confirmed that gaze behaviour represents an 
important social cue that has profound impacts on our behaviour. In fact, the 
intentions to cooperate (or not) of other individuals, such as in the case they are 
willing to reach a state of JA with us, can be implicitly learned on the basis of a 
previous social encounter and go on to affect our subsequent responses to that 
individuals. However, another explanation based on the different degree of difficulty 
of the task associated with each group of faces could explain the results emerged in 
Experiment 1. For this reason, I decided to conduct Experiment 1/B as a control task. 
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Experiment 1/B 
 
This second experiment has been carried out in order to rule out a potential 
alternative hypothesis which could explain results observe in Experiment 1. In fact, it 
is worth to point out that the group of faces which lead to a state of JA was always 
associated with a saccade, whereas the group of faces associated with a state of D-JA 
was always associated with an antisaccade. Due to the fact that perform a saccade is 
easier than perform an antisaccade (e.g., Wolohan & Crawford, 2012), one could 
argue that what participants actually learned during the learning phase was not related 
with faces’ gaze behavior but simply with the difficulty associated with each group of 
faces. In order to test this alternative hypothesis, I decided to conduct a control 
experiment in which, in the episodic learning phase, a two group of faces were 
associated with an easier and a more difficult task, respectively. Subsequently, same 
faces were employed in a standard gaze-cueing task. In the case the different degree 
of difficulty was responsible of the results emerged in Experiment 1, here I expected 
to observe a similar pattern of results. Otherwise, I expected to observe no effect of 
this variable on gaze-cueing effect. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Nineteen students at the University of East Anglia (Mean age = 23 years; SD = 
4; 4 males) participated in return for payment (£7) or credits course. All had correct or 
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correct to normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the experiment and gave a 
written consent approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 1. 
 
Task 1: Easy vs. difficult task 
 
The procedure was the same as that in Experiment 1 (Task 1) with the 
following exceptions: participants were instructed to maintain their eyes always at the 
centre of the screen, placeholders were absent and after the averted gaze face onset a 
black target line (1.3° height × 0.4° width) appeared 9.8° rightwards or leftwards from 
fixation. The target line could be vertically inclined of ±5° or ±45°. Participants were 
instructed to press the ‘Z’ key with their left index finger in case the line was inclined 
leftwards (i.e., −5° or −45°), and the ‘M’ key with their right index finger in case the 
line was inclined rightwards (i.e., +5° or +45°). In this manner, a different degree of 
difficulty was associated to the task required to participants. 
The target line was always congruent to gaze direction of the central face. For 
half of the participants, faces belonging to Face Group A looked always towards a 
target line inclined ±5°, so they were associated with a more difficult response, 
whereas faces belonging to Face Group B looked always towards a target line inclined 
±45°, so they were associated with an easier response. For the other half of the 
participants, this association was inverted. 
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Task 2: Gaze-cueing task 
 
The procedure was the same as that in Experiment 1 (Task 2). The whole 
Experiment (Task 1 and Task 2) lasted about 1 hour. 
 
Results 
 
Task 1: Easy vs. difficult task 
 
Errors (3.66 % of trials) and outliers, defined as trials in which RTs were 3 SD 
above and below participant’s mean (1.4 % of trials), were discarded RTs from 
analysis. 
The percentages of errors for each participant in each condition were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Target inclination (±5° vs. 
±45°) and SOA (200 ms vs. 1200 ms) as within-subjects factors. Only the main effect 
of the inclination of the target was significant, F(1,18) = 5.052, p = .037, η2p = .219, 
owing to fewer errors in response to targets inclined ±45° (M = 2.8 %, SD = 6.16) 
than ±5° (M = 4.5 %, SD = 5.26). Neither the main effect of SOA nor the interaction 
Target inclination × SOA approached statistical significance (all ps > .517). 
A second ANOVA was conducted on mean RT with the same factors 
considered for the analysis of the errors. The main effect of Target inclination was 
significant, F(1,18) = 128.482, p < .001, η2p = .877, owing to smaller RTs in response 
to targets inclined ±45° (M = 541 ms, SD = 100.5) than ±5° (M = 625 ms, SD = 120.7) 
whereas the main effect of SOA did not reach statistical significance (p = .726). The 
interaction Target inclination × SOA was significant, F(1,18) = 7.011, p = .016, η2p = 
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.28. Paired comparison between targets inclined ±5° and ±45° divided by SOA 
revealed that RTs were smaller in response to the ±45° target inclination both at the 
shorter, t(18) = 8.340, p <.001, and at the longer, t(18) = 10.873, p < .001, SOA, but 
the difference between target inclination was greater in the former case (100 ms vs. 68 
ms). 
Taken together, these results confirmed that a different degree of difficulty 
was associated with the task required to participants. In particular, identify the 
direction of a target line was easier when it was inclined ±45° rather than ±5°, 
reflecting the performance associated with saccade and antisaccade movements 
emerged in the oculomotor task of Experiment 1. 
 
Task 2: Gaze-cueing task 
 
Errors (4.15 % of trials) and outliers, defined as trials in which RTs were 3 SD 
above and below participant’s mean (2.08 % of trials), were discarded RTs from 
analysis. 
The percentages of errors for each participant in each condition were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Cue-target spatial congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent), SOA (200 ms vs. 1200 ms) and Difficulty associated to 
face identity (easy vs. difficult) as within-subjects factors. No main effects or 
interactions emerged (ps > .12). 
A second ANOVA was conducted on mean RT with the same factors 
considered for the analysis of the errors. The main effect of Cue-target spatial 
congruency was significant, F(1,18) = 8.340, p = .01, η2p = .317, owing to smaller 
RTs on congruent (M = 656 ms, SD = 87.37) than on incongruent (M = 671 ms, SD = 
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95.66) trials. No other main effects or interactions approached statistical significance 
(ps > .37). 
 
Discussion 
 
Taken together, these results confirm that in Experiment 1 the different degree 
of difficulty associated with the oculomotor task cannot explain the pattern of the 
results observed in the subsequent gaze-cueing task. On this basis, I decided to deal 
with Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
In Experiment 2, the relationship between the participant and the central face 
that occurred in the episodic learning phase was inversed with respect to Experiment 
1. Namely, participants were asked to make a saccade or an antisaccade before that 
the central face moved its eyes. In this manner, participant’s response was subsequent 
to face’s behaviour, a condition of gaze leading (Bayliss et al., 2012; see also 
Schilbach et al., 2010). Also in this case, faces looked always towards the position in 
which the instruction cue appeared. After the learning phase, participants were asked 
to complete a standard gaze-cueing task in which same faces as previous task was 
employed. In this second task, faces were not predictive with regards to target 
position. 
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Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty-three students at the University of East Anglia (Mean age = 24 years; 
SD = 4.3; 3 males) participated in return for payment (7 pounds) or credit course. All 
had correct or correct to normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the experiment 
and gave a written consent approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 1. 
 
Task 1: Saccade/antisaccade task 
 
The procedure was the same as that Experiment 1 (Task 1) with the following 
exceptions: after the fixation cross, a central face with direct gaze appeared for 1700 
or 2700 ms, depending on SOA. These two SOA were chosen in order to present 
faces for a temporal duration comparable to that in Experiment 1. After that, the 
instruction cue appeared and participants were asked to move their eyes towards the 
correct placeholder (i.e., on saccade trials, towards the placeholder that turned green 
and, on antisaccade trials, towards the opposite placeholder with respect to the one 
that turned red). After 300 ms of fixating the placeholder the eyes of the central face 
moved to either look at, or away from the placeholder at which the participant was 
looking. 
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Like in Experiment 1, the gaze direction of the central face was always 
spatially congruent to the instruction cue position. For half of the participants, faces 
belonging to Face Group A looked always towards the same placeholder (green) that 
participant was looking at (JA faces), whereas faces belonging to Face Group B 
looked always towards the opposite placeholder (red) that participant was looking at 
(D-JA faces). For the other half of the participants, this association was reversed. 
After 500 ms, with participant still looking at the placeholder and face’s eyes still 
averted, a trial ended (see Figure 11, panel B). 
 
Task 2: Gaze-cueing task 
 
The procedure was the same as that in Task 2 of Experiment 1 (see Figure 11, 
Panel C). The whole Experiment (Task 1 and Task 2) lasted about 1 hour. 
 
Results 
 
Task 1: Saccade/antisaccade task 
 
Saccades were extracted using the same procedure as that in Experiment 1 
(Task 1). 
Trials containing blinks (3.1 %) were removed. Errors, namely trials in which 
the first saccade was in the opposite direction according to the instruction cue (4.5 %), 
were excluded from RTs and analysed separately. Outliers, defined as trials in which 
sRTs were 3 standard deviations above and below participant’s mean (1.09 %), were 
discarded from analysis. 
 83 
The percentages of errors for each participant in each condition were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Task (antisaccade vs. saccade) 
and SOA (200 ms vs. 1200 ms) as within-subjects factors. The main effect of Task 
was significant, F(1,22) = 5.910, p = .024 , η2p = .212, owing to less errors for the 
saccade (M = 2.7 %, SD = 3.4) than for the antisaccade (M = 5.8 %, SD = 6.8) 
movements. Neither the main effect of SOA nor the interaction Task × SOA 
approached statistical significance (ps > .399). 
A second ANOVA was conducted on mean sRTs with the same factors 
considered for the analysis of the errors. The main effect of Task was significant, 
F(1,22) = 11.197, p = .003 , η2p = .337, owing to smaller RTs for the saccade (M = 
330 ms, SE = 59.7) than for the antisaccade (M = 354 ms, SD = 65.6) movements, as 
well as the main effect of SOA, F(1,22) = 31.578, p < .001 , η2p = .589, owing to 
smaller RTs at the longer (M = 327 ms, SD = 63.1) than at the shorter (M = 356 ms, 
SD = 59.7) SOA. The interaction Task × SOA was not significant (F < 1). 
Taken together, these results confirmed that saccades were easier to perform 
than antisaccades, in line with Experiment 1. 
 
Task 2: Gaze-cueing task 
 
Errors (3.45 % of trials) and outliers, defined as trials in which RTs were 3 SD 
above and below participant’s mean (1.9 % of trials), were discarded from RTs 
analysis. 
The percentages of errors for each participant in each condition were 
submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA with Cue-target spatial congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent), SOA (200 ms vs. 1200 ms) and Type of face (D-JA face 
 84 
vs. JA face) as within-subjects factors The main effect of Cue-target spatial 
congruency approached statistical significance, F(1,22) = 3.048, p = .095, η2p = .122, 
reflecting more errors on incongruent (M = 3.8 %, SD = 3.3) than on congruent (M = 
3.1 %, SD = 2.7) trials. The interaction Cue-target spatial congruency × SOA was 
significant, F(1,22) = 9.469, p = .006, η2p = .301. Paired comparisons between 
congruent and incongruent trials for each SOA showed that at the shorter SOA 
participants committed more errors on incongruent than on congruent trials, t(22) = 
3.087, p = .005, whereas no differences emerged at the longer SOA, t(22) = .755, p = 
.458. No other main effects or interactions approached significance (ps > .45). 
A second ANOVA was conducted on mean RTs with the same factors 
considered for the analysis of the errors. The main effect of Cue-target spatial 
congruency was significant, F(1,22) = 22.758, p < .001, η2p = .508, owing to smaller 
RTs on congruent (M = 687 ms, SD = 126) than on incongruent (M = 708 ms, SD = 
128) trials, as well as the main effect of SOA, F(1,22) = 5.298, p = .031, η2p = .194, 
owing to smaller RTs at the longer (M = 689 ms, SD = 132.9) than at the longer (M = 
706 ms, SD = 122.6) SOA. The interaction SOA × Type of face was significant, 
F(1,22) = 7.075, p = .014, η2p = .243 (see Figure 12). Also the interaction Cue-target 
spatial congruency × Type of face was significant, F(1,22) = 4.972, p = .036, η2p = 
.184. I further analysed only the latter interaction; paired comparison between 
congruent and incongruent trials for each type of face revealed that participants 
oriented their attention in response both to D-JA, t(22) = 4.409, p < .001, and to JA, 
t(22) = 2.182, p = .04, faces. However, the magnitude of the gaze cueing was bigger 
in the former case (31 ms vs. 12 ms). The triple interaction Cue-target spatial 
congruency × SOA × Type was not significant (F < 1). Nevertheless, for 
completeness and because this interaction had been significant in Experiment 1, 
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paired comparison between congruent and incongruent trials divided by type of face 
and SOA revealed that participants shifted their attention in response to D-JA faces at 
both SOA (ps < .01) but not in response to JA faces at either SOA (ps > .135). 
 
Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 was aimed to replicate the pattern of the results observed in 
Experiment 1 by varying the initiating member of the triadic interactions during the 
learning phase. In fact, while in Experiment 1 participant’s response was subsequent 
to face’s behavior, here face behavior was subsequent to participant’s response. This 
condition of gaze leading has been largely neglected, but a few recent studies 
suggested that it is be of great interest indeed (e.g., Bayliss et al., 2012; Schilbach, 
2010).  
Results provided by Experiment 2 overlap only partially with those observed 
in Experiment 1. Indeed, similarly to Experiment 1, at the 1200-ms SOA participants 
showed a reliable gaze-cueing effect in response to faces that led to a state of D-JA 
but not in response to faces that led to a state of JA. Hence, it seems that even in a 
condition of gaze leading, when the level of the SOA allows the emergence of 
volitional processes, such as in the case of the 1200-ms SOA, JA faces would lose 
their reliability favouring the tendency to ignore their gaze direction whereas an 
opposite strategy would be implemented in response to D-JA faces. However, 
contrarily to Experiment 1, an identical pattern of results emerged even at the 200-ms 
SOA, namely, JA faces still failed to elicit gaze-cueing effect in the face of a reliable 
gaze-cueing effect in response to D-JA faces. This surprisingly, yet unexpected, 
result, would mean that even when reflexive orienting mechanisms are likely to occur, 
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as in the case of the 200-ms SOA, JA faces would considered as less reliable with 
respect to D-JA faces. The discrepancy of these results with that observed in 
Experiment 1 should be mainly sought in the different conditions implemented during 
the learning phase. In fact, while in the learning phase of Experiment 1 participant’s 
eye movement was subsequent to that of the central face, here in Experiment 2 the 
central face move its eyes after that participant’s eye movement. Schilbach et al. 
(2010) found that this two different type behaviour (i.e., gaze following and gaze 
leading) recruit different neural circuits when participants where asked to reach a state 
of JA or D-JA with a computer-generated avatar. Hence, it is possible that this 
differences at a neural level could even impact at a behavioural level for a particularly 
long time interval, thus influencing the subsequent gaze-cueing task. To my 
knowledge, the present study represents finalized in understanding in the normal 
population the potential impact of social information, acquired through an implicit 
learning, on gaze cueing of attention. For this reason, it is objectively hard try to draw 
other potential explanations that could be reasonably explain the results observed 
here, in particular that emerged in Experiment 2. Future work is planned to examine 
in depth the potential impact of social variables that here have been neglected, such as 
autistic traits, gender differences, and individual variables such as trustworthiness and 
attractiveness associated with each face stimulus. In so doing, a more holistic view 
concerning implicit social learning and its effects on social attention could, hopefully, 
emerge. 
Overall, these two experiments that compose Study 3 highlights the potential 
to employ social stimuli in gaze-contingent eye-tracking tasks in order to create 
innovative and stimulating interactive paradigms. A large implementation of that 
paradigms may provide to researchers the opportunity to enlarge and expand the 
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investigation of social attention. In fact, I believe that, due to the reciprocal nature of 
social interaction in which, generally, two individuals act and react also on the basis 
of other’s behaviour, gaze-contingent eye-tracking tasks could help to address the 
differential contribution many social processes, both implicit and explicit, under 
ecologically valid conditions. Furthermore, due to relatively novelty of these 
interactive paradigms, many different future directions can be currently followed in 
order to expand knowledge of some mechanisms which rule social cognition. 
To conclude, taken together these two studies provide further evidence of the 
importance of others’ gaze behaviour in modulating our own behaviour, supporting to 
the idea that would see the person perception system playing a key role in shaping 
social attention mechanisms. Future work is currently planned to persecute along this 
line of research. 
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2.4. Study 4 
Is social attention impaired in schizophrenia? 
 
Dalmaso, M., Galfano, G., Tarqui, L., Forti, B., & Castelli, L. (2013). Is social 
attention impaired in schizophrenia? Gaze but not pointing gestures is 
associated with spatial attention deficits. Neuropsychology, 27, 608-613. 
 
The notion that attentional processing may be impaired in schizophrenia has 
been the focus of extensive research, especially with spatial cuing paradigms (Luck & 
Gold, 2008). These consist of the presentation of a spatial cue providing information 
concerning the location of a subsequent peripheral target stimulus requiring a 
response (e.g., Posner, 1980). The vast majority of studies involving schizophrenic 
patients have focused on reflexive attentional orienting elicited by uninformative 
peripheral abrupt onsets, reporting that, relative to controls, the magnitude of spatial 
orienting in schizophrenics seems to be even enhanced, at least under some 
circumstances (e.g., Fuentes, Boucart, Alvarez, Vivas, & Zimmerman, 1999). Much 
less is known about reflexive orienting elicited by social cues. More generally, 
evidence is accumulating showing that schizophrenic patients are impaired in dealing 
with social stimuli, in particular in processing information conveyed by eye gaze (e.g., 
Hooker & Park, 2005; Tso et al., 2012). As reported in the intoductive section, 
looking at gaze is an essential ability to create an empathic contact among individuals 
and gaze is a key factor in the regulation of social interactions (e.g., Emery, 2000). 
Moreover, in healthy participants, the gaze-cuing paradigm typically triggers reflexive 
shifts of attention towards the spatial location indicated by gaze (e.g., Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998) followed by IOR (e.g., Frischen & Tipper, 2004). The few existing 
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studies addressing gaze cuing in schizophrenic patients reported a different trend. 
Indeed, schizophrenics exhibit IOR for peripheral onset but not for gaze cues (Nestor, 
Klein, Pomplun, Niznikiewicz, & McCarley, 2010) while the immediate attentional 
response to gaze cues is more controversial. In this regard, Langdon, Corner, 
McLaren, Coltheart, & Ward (2006) reported that, compared to healthy controls, 
schizophrenic patients showed an early-rising reflexive shift of attention. At short 
SOA, that is when the time in between cue onset and target onset was set to 100 
milliseconds (ms), a gaze-cuing effect emerged only among schizophrenic patients. At 
longer SOAs (i.e., 300 and 800 ms), gaze cuing was reliable and undistinguished in 
both schizophrenics and healthy controls. A very different pattern has recently been 
reported by Akiyama et al. (2008). They hypothesized that abnormal gaze cuing might 
specifically be observed in long-term, unremitted patients, given that hyposensitivity 
to social stimuli is prominent in chronic schizophrenia (e.g., Hooker & Park, 2005; 
Tso et al., 2012). In comparing gaze cues with central arrows, Akiyama et al. (2008) 
observed no differences in performance between chronic schizophrenics and healthy 
controls with regards to arrow-driven orienting of attention. However, in line with 
predictions, a decreased attentional response to gaze was observed among 
schizophrenics but not among healthy controls. Importantly, experimental 
manipulations employed by Langdon et al. (2006) and Akiyama et al. (2008) to create 
gaze cues were extremely polarized. On the one hand, Langdon et al. (2006) cued 
participants’ attention by means of a turn of the head and eyes, namely they presented 
two simultaneous social cues (i.e., gaze and head direction). On the other hand, 
Akiyama et al. (2008) used a particularly impoverished social cue (i.e., a pair of 
rectangular vs. elliptic eyes). 
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The first goal of the present study was to further explore gaze-cuing response 
in schizophrenic patients using a gaze cue in isolation (i.e., the spatial cue only 
included gaze direction) but presenting the eyes embedded in a face, in order to 
provide a more ecological stimulus. Secondly, I aimed to explore the extent to which 
the altered social cuing response, if any, is specific to gaze stimuli or extends to other 
socially relevant cues instead. In this regard, pointing gestures elicit consistent 
attention shifts in healthy participants and are indeed powerful social cues for 
communicating information and intentions among humans (e.g., Cazzato et al., 2012; 
Langton, O’Malley, Bruce, 1996;). Previous studies addressing social cuing in 
schizophrenia only focused on gaze. For this reason, including pointing gestures in a 
modified spatial-cuing paradigm is particularly relevant for understanding whether 
any eventual impairment involves social cues overall or whether abnormal processing 
is confined to eye gaze. Thus, my second goal was testing whether the altered 
attentional response demostrated by schizophrenic patients reported in previous 
studies reflects gaze-specific impairments or rather it is the consequence of a more 
general impaired mechanism in processing social stimuli. In addition to gaze and 
pointing cues, arrow cues were also included in my study, in order to obtain a direct 
comparison between social and symbolic stimuli (see also Akiyama et al., 2008; 
Spencer et al., 2011). I predicted that healthy controls would shift attention to the 
cued location irrespective of cue type. In contrast, previous work might lead one to 
predict either a similar (Langdon et al., 2006) or a decreased (Akiyama et al., 2008) 
gaze-cuing effect for schizophrenic patients compared to healthy controls. Any altered 
attentional response for both gaze and pointing gestures would support the view that 
schizophrenia is associated with a general deficit in social cognition processes. On the 
other hand, any eventual pattern of findings showing an altered attentional response 
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only for gaze cues would be consistent with the view that gaze is a special social 
signal characterized by unique ontogenetic and phylogenetic roots (e.g., Farroni et al., 
2002). Finally, no altered attentional response was expected in schizophrenics for 
arrow cues, due to their symbolic nature. 
 
Experiment 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Eighteen outpatient clinical participants were recruited from two psychiatric 
clinics located in northern Italy. Fifteen patients had a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
three were diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. Diagnoses were made by a board-
certified attending research team of psychiatrists using the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD-10, World Health Organization, 1992). Eighteen healthy 
participants, selected carefully to be perfectly matched by gender, age and education 
with schizophrenic patients, participated as controls. They were interviewed and 
reported neither personal nor family history of psychiatric/neurological illness. 
Demographic and clinical information are summarized in Table 2. All participants had 
a normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve about the purposes of the 
experiment, and took part on a voluntary basis. The experiment was approved by the 
local ethics committee. 
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Table 2. Demographic and clinical information of participants. 
 
 Schizophrenic patients 
(N=18) 
Healthy controls 
(N=18) 
Mean age (years) 49 (7.12) 49 (7.04) 
Gender M 9, F 9 M 9, F 9 
Handedness R 18 R 18 
Mean education (years) 9.33 (2.83) 9.67 (2.63) 
Mean age of illness onset (years) 28.5 (5.18)  
Mean duration of illness (years) 21 (7.24)  
Typical antipsychotic medication (%) 45.9  
Atypical antipsychotic medication (%) 54.1  
 
Note. Values in brackets are SD. The most frequently used typical antipsychotic medication 
was Bromperidol, used in conjunction with Aripiprazole and Fluphenazine (N=1), Clozapine (N=2), 
Clozapine and Clotiapine (N=1), Clozapine and Olanzapine (N=1), Levomepromazine (N=1), 
Levomepromazine and Clotiapine (N=1). The most frequently used atypical antipsychotic medication 
was Clozapine, used in conjunction with Haloperidol (N=3), followed by Quetiapine used in 
conjunction with Haloperidol (N=1), Olanzapine (N=1), Paliperidone (N=1), and Perphenazine (N=1). 
Olanzapine was also used in conjunction with Haloperidol (N=1), and Levomepromazine (N=1). Two 
schizophrenic patients were also prescribed Olanzapine (N=1) and Risperidon (N=1) alone. The mean 
chlorpromazine (CPZ) equivalent daily dose of antipsychotic was 286.11 gr (SD= 303.8). 
Pharmacological therapy included also anxiolytics (benzodiazepines). 
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Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Three different stimuli were used as cues and presented in three distinct blocks 
of trials. In the arrow-cue block, the cue was an arrow (3.8° × 1.6°) oriented leftwards 
or rightwards; in the pointing finger-cue block, the cue was a schematic pointing 
finger (3.8° × 2.7°) oriented leftwards or rightwards; in the gaze-cue block, the cue 
was a schematic face (6° of diameter) with gaze averted leftwards or rightwards. The 
regions that in each cue provided spatial information were identical in size (3.8° × 
1.6°). The arrow cue was drawn with a symmetric tale and head in order to be 
comparable to the two eyes of the face cue conveying directional information (also 
see Galfano et al., 2012). Participants sat approximately 57 cm from a 15-inch laptop 
monitor (1024 × 768 pixel, 60 Hz) on which stimuli were presented, using E-prime 
1.1, in white against a black background. 
Each trial began with a fixation cross (1°) visible for 675 ms at the centre of 
the screen, followed by a central cue. After either a 200-ms or 700-ms SOA, a target 
stimulus represented by a filled circle (1.5°) appeared 9° rightwards or leftwards with 
respect to the centre of the screen. Two different SOAs were used in order to 
investigate the time course of attention shifting elicited by the different cues. Both cue 
and target remained visible until the participant responded or 3000 ms were elapsed, 
whichever came first. The target was spatially congruent or incongruent to cue 
direction with the same probability. Participants were told that cue direction was 
uninformative with regards to target location and they were instructed to maintain 
fixation at the centre of the screen throughout each trial. They were asked to detect the 
target by pressing the space bar with their dominant hand as fast as possible, and to 
refrain from responding and wait for the next trial when a catch trial was displayed, 
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namely when no target was shown. Catch trials were included to prevent anticipatory 
responses. The red words “ERROR” and “NO RESPONSE” were presented when 
participants responded on catch trials (i.e., false alarms) and when they failed to 
respond (i.e., missed responses), respectively. Finally, a blank screen appeared for 
1000 ms (see Figure 13). Order of blocks was randomized separately for each 
participant, and cue type was constant within each block. Each experimental block 
included 96 target present trials and 24 catch trials and was preceded by a practice 
block containing 8 target present trials and 2 catch trials. In total, each participant 
went through 360 experimental trials. The entire session required about 40 minutes. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Illustration of stimuli (not drawn to scale) and sequence of events for a spatially 
congruent trial with arrow (A) and pointing finger (B) cues, and for a spatially incongruent trial with 
gaze cue (C). 
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Results 
 
False alarms (0.4 %), missed responses (1.17 %) and anticipations defined as 
RTs less than 100 ms (0.17 %) were removed. Due to the low rate of errors, they were 
not analysed further. Raw data of each participant were then transformed to 
reciprocals in order to reduce the influence of extreme RTs and to obtain a more 
normal distribution of values (Howell, 2010, pp. 340-341; also see Slessor, Phillips, & 
Bull, 2008). Although analyses were carried out on reciprocal scores, for easy of 
interpretation, descriptive statistics are reported also as untransformed mean RTs (see 
Table 3). 
A mixed-design repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on mean 
reciprocal scores, with Cue-target spatial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), 
Cue type (arrow vs. pointing finger vs. gaze) and SOA (200 vs. 700 ms) as within-
participants factors, and Group (schizophrenic patients vs. healthy controls) as 
between-participants factor. Cue-target spatial congruency was significant, F(1,34) = 
30.685, p < .001, η2p = .474, indicating lower RTs for congruent relative to 
incongruent trials. Group was also significant, F(1,34) = 5.392, p = .026, η2p =. 137, 
indicating slower RTs for schizophrenics. Both the Cue-target spatial congruency × 
Cue type interaction, F(2,68) = 4.453, p = .015, η2p = .116, and the Cue-target spatial 
congruency × SOA interaction, F(1,34) = 22.727, p = .012, η2p = .171, were 
significant. More interestingly, the four-way Cue-target spatial congruency × Cue 
type × SOA × Group interaction approached statistical significance, F(2,68) = 2.501, 
p = .09, η2p = .069. No other main effects or interactions were significant. Although 
the four-way interaction did not reach conventional levels of significance, two 
separate 2 (Cue-target spatial congruency) × 3 (Cue type) × 2 (SOA) repeated 
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measures ANOVAs were performed for the two groups, as within-participants designs 
provide better control of individual differences. For healthy controls, there was only a 
significant main effect of Cue-target spatial congruency, F(1,17) = 18.069, p = .001, 
η2p = .515, indicating lower RTs for congruent relative to incongruent trials. The Cue-
target spatial congruency × Cue type interaction was not significant, F(2,34) = 1.669, 
p = .203, η2p = .089. Two-tailed paired-samples t-tests comparing congruent and 
incongruent trials confirmed that healthy controls oriented their attention in response 
to arrow, t(17) = 2.347, p = .031, pointing finger, t(17) = 4.975, p < .001, and gaze, 
t(17) = 2.343, p = .032, indistinguishably. For schizophrenic patients, there was a 
significant main effect of cue-target spatial congruency, F(1,17) = 13.584, p = .002, 
η2p = .444, indicating lower RTs for congruent relative to incongruent trials, as well as 
a significant Cue-target spatial congruency × SOA interaction, F(1,17) = 7.498, p = 
.014, η2p = .306. Two-tailed paired-samples t-tests indicated that schizophrenics 
shifted their attention to the cued location both at the shorter, t(17) = 1.829, p = .043, 
and at the longer, t(17) = 4.147, p < .001, SOA, although the effect was stronger in the 
latter case, suggesting an increased orienting response at longer intervals. Critically, 
the Cue-target spatial congruency × Cue type interaction was also significant, F(2,34) 
= 3.643, p = .037, η2p = .176. All the key findings for the purpose of the study 
remained significant also when additional ANOVAs collapsing across levels of SOA, 
were performed. Two-tailed paired-samples t-tests comparing congruent and 
incongruent trials confirmed that schizophrenics shifted their attention in response to 
arrows, t(17) = 2.499, p = .022, and pointing fingers, t(17) = 4.298, p < .001, but not 
in response to gaze, t(17) = .664, p = .52 (see Figure 14). In the attempt to obtain 
further evidence about the lack of gaze cuing among schizophrenic patients, data were 
also submitted to Bayesian analyses. This approach helps in trying to disentangle 
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which model (null vs. alternative hypothesis) is more strongly supported by the 
available data and is particularly helpful for dealing with the null hypothesis 
appropriately. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was computed following the 
procedure proposed by Masson (2011). This analysis showed that the posterior 
probability favouring the hypothesis that gaze cuing was absent in schizophrenic 
patients was pBIC(H0 | D) = 0.771. In contrast, the posterior probability favouring the 
hypothesis that gaze cuing was absent in healthy controls was pBIC(H0 | D) = 0.255. 
Within this framing, BIC values lower than 0.50 indicate that there is more evidence 
for the alternative than for the null hypothesis, whereas values higher than 0.50 
indicate the opposite. According to the conventional categorization of degrees of 
evidence (see Masson, 2011), the obtained posterior probabilities for the null 
hypothesis constitute “positive” evidence for the conclusion that no gaze-cuing effect 
is present in schizophrenics, whereas a real cuing effect is present in the control 
group. 
To control for effects due to medication, if any, three additional Analyses of 
Covariance were performed with CPZ equivalent dosage as a covariate. Cuing effects 
were observed for both arrows and pointing gestures whereas no gaze cuing emerged 
(F = .13). This further supports the conclusion that gaze cuing is impaired among 
schizophrenics. 
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Figure 14. Mean RTs of schizophrenic patients and healthy controls for spatially congruent 
and incongruent trials as a function of the cue. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Asterisks denote t-test p < 0.05. NS = not significant. 
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Table 3. Mean RTs (in ms) and Reciprocal Scores (RS) computed from raw RTs data for spatially congruent and incongruent trials as a function of both cue 
type and SOA, for schizophrenic patients and healthy controls. Values in brackets are SD. C = congruent trials; I = incongruent trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Arrows Pointing Finger Gaze 
 200 700 200 700 200 700 
 C I C I C I C I C I C I 
 RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS RT RS 
Schizophrenic 
Patients 
706 
(328) 
0.001781 
(0.000579) 
749 
(319) 
0.001698 
(0.000511) 
710 
(318) 
0.001807 
(0.000565) 
732 
(305) 
0.001703 
(0.000491) 
711 
(350) 
0.001826 
(0.000625) 
 719 
(358) 
0.001805 
(0.000602) 
713 
(372) 
0.001881 
(0.000627) 
748 
(322) 
0.001684 
(0.000528) 
654 
(216) 
0.001841 
(0.000517) 
657 
(208) 
0.001832 
(0.000443) 
635 
(198) 
0.001889 
(0.000498) 
641 
(202) 
0.001868 
(0.000494) 
Healthy 
Controls 
501 
(146) 
0.002219 
(0.000528) 
536 
(181) 
0.002154 
(0.000563) 
518 
(164) 
0.002197 
(0.000569) 
528 
(165) 
0.002155 
(0.000559) 
505 
(195) 
0.002284 
(0.000551) 
522 
(184) 
0.002198 
(0.000521) 
500 
(183) 
0.002293 
(0.000583) 
522 
(183) 
0.002189 
(0.000553) 
533 
(205) 
0.002186 
(0.000552) 
532 
(209) 
0.002175 
(0.000535) 
531 
(229) 
0.002235 
(0.000625) 
545 
(194) 
0.002139 
(0.000539) 
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Discussion 
 
The purpose of the present study was twofold. First, I aimed to clarify the 
presence, if any, of abnormal gaze-cuing effects in schizophrenia. In this regard, the 
available studies in the literature have reported mixed evidence. Langdon et al. (2006) 
reported consistent gaze-cuing effects for schizophrenic patients using a 100-ms SOA, 
with performance becoming similar to that of healthy controls at longer SOAs. In 
contrast, Akiyama et al. (2008) have recently reported overall decreased gaze-cuing 
effects in schizophrenic patients with respect to controls, in the presence of 
undifferentiated and reliable cuing effects for both groups when arrow cues were 
used. Results confirmed the pattern reported by Akiyama et al. (2008), and showed 
that schizophrenic patients’ and healthy controls’ performance could be dissociated 
when considering gaze but not arrow cues. In addition, abnormal processing for gaze 
stimuli was identified by a reduced gaze-cuing effect in schizophrenic but not in 
control participants. Critical factors for accounting for the discrepant results emerging 
from the current study and those reported by Langdon et al. (2006) may include the 
use of different types of gaze cues, as well as the duration of illness of the clinical 
samples that were tested. In this latter regard, hyposensitivity to gaze stimuli seems to 
become a typical schizophrenic trait only as the course of illness becomes chronic. 
Whereas the clinical samples included in both the present study and Akiyama et al. 
(2008) consisted of chronic schizophrenic patients, duration of illness in 
schizophrenic patients tested by Langdon et al. (2006) was shorter.  
The second goal of the present study was addressing whether abnormal 
attentional processing of social stimuli was specific to gaze or not. This was tested 
using a pointing gesture, a social cue other than gaze, that has been shown to elicit 
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robust attention shifting effects (e.g., Cazzato et al., 2012). In this regard, the present 
results showed that, similar to healthy controls, schizophrenic patients exhibited a 
reliable attentional orienting effect moderated by pointing gestures. This finding 
seems to suggest that the attentional deficit in processing social stimuli among 
schizophrenic patients is selective for gaze cues. 
The latter pattern of results could be explained in terms of the special status of 
eye gaze, among other social and non-social cues, suggested by previous studies. 
Indeed, there is abundant evidence that prioritized gaze processing can be observed 
very early in childhood (Farroni et al., 2002) and gaze-cuing effects are even 
detectable in several animal species other than humans (e.g., Deaner & Platt, 2003; 
for a review see Shepherd, 2010), highlighting the importance of eye gaze at both an 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic level. Importantly, evidence concerning a prioritized 
response for other social signals such as pointing gestures is more scarce and less 
unequivocal (Shepherd, 2010).  
The presence of impaired gaze cuing in schizophrenia could be linked to a 
dysfunction in the complex neural network regulating social processing that critically 
involves the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) region. There is abundant neuroimaging 
evidence showing that STS region is critically activated during gaze processing in 
healthy humans (Allison et al., 2000). Although some studies have reported that STS 
would also be engaged in processing directional information from other symbolic 
(Tipper, Handy, Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008), and social (Sato, Kochiyama, Uono, 
& Yoshikawa, 2009) signals, some studies seem to suggest that involvement of STS 
region would be specific for eye gaze (e.g., Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan, 2004). 
Moreover, Akiyama et al. (2006) have reported a single-case study of a brain 
damaged patient with a lesion involving the right STS, who showed no gaze-cuing 
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effect, in the face of spared arrow-driven orienting. Crucially, there is evidence of 
decreased activity of the STS region in schizophrenic patients (e.g., Rajarethinam, 
Venkatesh, Peethala, Luan Phan, & Keshavan, 2011). Hence, the observation that 
schizophrenics exhibit a reduced gaze-cuing response may be related to abnormal 
functioning in the STS region. Although symbolic (e.g., an arrow) or social signals 
other than gaze (e.g., a pointing gesture) can call STS into play to some extent, it has 
been shown that STS activity is much more pronounced for gaze than for these other 
signals (e.g., Greene et al., 2011; Sato et al., 2009). Therefore, the results of the 
present study seem overall consistent with the available neuropsychological data. 
In sum, the present findings support the notion that schizophrenics show 
impaired gaze-cuing effects and are consistent with the observation of altered gaze-
driven IOR for schizophrenic patients (Nestor et al., 2010). In addition, it appears that 
the observed deficit does not extend to other important social cues such as a pointing 
gesture. However, future work is needed to establish whether other types of social 
cuing that were not tested here are impaired in schizophrenia. 
One limitation of the study is that I was unable to administer standardized 
measures of neuropsychological tests. Hence, the possibility of examining the 
contributions of neuropsychological functioning in schizophrenic patients and its 
relationship with symptom variables, with regards to attentional response to social vs. 
non-social cues, was precluded. Although these issues have been addressed in 
previous work (e.g., Akiyama et al., 2008; Nestor et al., 2010) further research is 
needed to fully understand the extent to which abnormal response to gaze stimuli is 
related to neuropsychological measures and affective symptoms in schizophrenic 
patients. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOCIAL MODULATORS OF SOCIAL INHIBITION OF RETURN 
 
The phenomenon of Inhibition of Return (IOR), partially introduced in 
Chapter 2, is an attentional mechanism that consists in the tendency to avoid orienting 
attention towards spatial positions already explored. Experimentally, IOR has been 
reported for the first time in a spatial cueing task using peripheral cues (Posner & 
Cohen, 1984). In this task, participants were asked to maintain fixation on a central 
spot. Two squared placeholders were placed to the right and to the left of the central 
spot. After a certain period of time, one of the two placeholders flashed for 150 ms 
and, after a variable SOA, a target appeared inside one of them. This target could 
randomly appear inside the placeholder which get flash (i.e., a valid trial) or inside the 
opposite one (i.e., invalid trial). Results showed that, on the one hand, when the level 
of SOA was smaller than 300 ms RTs were smaller for the valid than for the invalid 
trials. This because attention, captured by the onset of the peripheral cue, was already 
positioned on the spatial position on which the target would have appeared. Instead, 
on the other hand, when the level of SOA was equal or greater than 300 ms, RTs were 
smaller for the invalid than for the valid trials. Authors explained this “bizarre” 
pattern of results proposing that the attention, initially positioned on the cue, then 
would have moved on the other location, favouring in this manner the elaboration of 
the target on the invalid trial. For this reason, IOR can be considered as a kind of 
bridge between memory and attention that would allow to “remember”, for then 
inhibit, the spatial positions that have been already explored. Under an adaptive 
prospective, avoiding that our focus of attention moves back towards a spatial 
recently explored would help individuals in exploring the surrounding environment in 
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a particularly efficient manner (e.g., Galfano, Betta, & Turatto, 2004; for reviews see 
Klein, 2000 and Lupiáñez et al., 2006). 
IOR has been widely investigated by using different paradigms other than the 
one proposed by Posner and Cohen (1984). For instance, IOR has been observed also 
adopting a modified version of the standard gaze-cueing task (Frischen & Tipper, 
2004). This modified version consists of presenting participants with faces with 
averted gaze to the left or right. After that, the gaze is reoriented back to the center. 
Such reorienting is aimed to encourage the disengagement of attention from the cued 
location, in order to facilitate the emergence of IOR. After a SOA particularly long, 
which is typically set to 2400 ms, a peripheral target appears in congruent or in an 
incongruent spatial position with respect to gaze direction. In so doing, it is possible 
to observe IOR in response to gaze cues (see also Frischen, Smilek, Eastwood, & 
Tipper, 2007; Marotta et al., 2012). More relevant for the present study, IOR has been 
recently observed even in a joint action task (Welsh et al., 2005). More specifically, 
pairs of naïve participants were asked to sit opposite each other and complete a series 
of rapid aiming movements to visual targets that could appear on the right or on the 
left. Participants responded alternatively, so that one made two successive aiming 
movements then the other made two successive movements, and so on. Results 
showed that participants were slower when repeating their own responses to a 
location. More interesting, however, was the observation that responses were also 
slower when directed to locations to which their partner had just responded. Welsh et 
al. (2005) concluded that IOR could emerge not only in response to own actions but 
even in response to actions performed by others, a phenomenon subsequently called 
social IOR (SIOR; Skarratt, Cole, & Kingstone, 2010). 
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So far, both IOR and SIOR has been reported in numerous studies which 
adopted the experimental apparatus developed by Welsh and collaborators (Cole, 
Skarratt, & Billing, 2011; Hayes, Hansen, & Elliott, 2010; Skarratt et al., 2010; 
Welsh, McDougall, & Weeks, 2009; Welsh et al., 2007). However, the potential 
impact of social variables in regulating this phenomenon has been scarcely 
considered. In fact, to my knoledge, only one study took into account individual 
differences, testing normal individuals versus individuals with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) who generally show significant deficits in social interactions (Welsh, 
Ray, Weeks, Dewey, & Elliott, 2009). In line with the hypothesis, result coming from 
that study showed that participants with ASD did not demonstrate SIOR in the face of 
a spared IOR. 
The present study represented an attempt to investigate wheteher a direct 
manipulation of some social variables, which charachterized people, can modulated 
SIOR. In particular, I manipulated the perceived similarity between individuals. In 
fact, recent studies reported that perceived similarity would deeply shape our 
perceptual (e.g., Serino, Giovagnoli, & Ladavas, 2009) and cognitive (e.g., Liew, 
Han, & Aziz-Zadeh, 2010) mechanisms, in particularly those involved in social 
attention. In fact, linking up to Chapter 2, it has been observed that the higher the 
perceived similarity, the stronger the gaze-cueing effect (Hungr & Hunt, 2012; Liuzza 
et al., 2011) and a similar pattern of results was expected even in the present study. 
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2.5. Study 5 
I follow you if you are similar to me (but even if you are not) 
 
This study was composed by two experiments. Experiment 1 was carried out 
to replicate the main findings reported by Welsh et al. (2005), namely the presence of 
both IOR and SIOR in a joint action task. In Experiment 2, I manipulated perceived 
similarity between participants. In more detail, a naïve participant was asked to read 
fictive information regarding a confederate who could be described as very similar or 
very dissimilar to him/her. After that, both individuals took part in the joint action 
task. I expected that the SIOR of naïve participants was greater in the case of higher 
perceived similarity with respect lower perceived similarity. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
This study was aimed to replicate the main results observed by Welsh et al. 
(2005), in order to validate the correct functioning of both the experimental apparatus, 
created ad hoc for this study, and the experimental paradigm. In particular, I expected 
to observe both IOR and SIOR, of comparable magnitude. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty students (Mean age = 23 years, SD = 1.11, 16 females, all right-
handed) of the University of Padova took part in this study on a voluntary basis. All 
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participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The local ethic committee 
approved the study. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Procedure was the same as that used in Welsh et al. (2005). Participants were 
divided in couples of same gender, in order to reduce any potential confounds due to 
this factor. Members of each couple, for instance A and B, sit opposite each other. In 
between them there was the experimental apparatus. This was composed by a metallic 
board connected to a PC running a custom program created with E-Prime 1.1. Four 
buttons were collocated on the surface of the board. Two of them, the “home” 
buttons, were collocated in front of each participant. The remaining two buttons, 
which contained a lamp, represented the “target” buttons and were collocated one on 
the right and one on the left of participants (see Figure 15). 
Initially, participants were askes to maintain pressed, with the index finger of 
the dominant hand, their “home” buttons. Subsequently, one of the two “target” 
buttons, selected randomly by the program, flashed for 100 ms. Then, one of the 
participants, for instance A, were asked to a) release his “home” button as fast as 
possible, recording thus a RT and b) perform a rapid aiming movement in order to 
press the “target” button which get flashed, recording thus a Movement Time (MT). 
After that, 1000 ms were granted in order to go back to press the “home” button. The 
sequence of movements was completed in an AABBAABBAA…(etc.) pattern. This 
design allowed to obtain both a condition in which the “target” button that get flashed 
in trial n was the same as that in trial n-1 (i.e., same target position), and a condition 
in which the “target” button that get flashed in trial n was different with respect to that 
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in trial n-1 (i.e., different target position). At the same time, this design allowed to 
examine both within-person (e.g., AA) and between-person (e.g., BB) IOR effects. 
There were 4 practice block, each composed by 16 trials, followed by 20 
experimental blocks, each composed by 33 trials in which both “target” buttons get 
flashed for an equal number of times. Overall, each participant responded to 660 
experimental trials. The whole procedure took about 30 minutes. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Illustration (not drawn to scale) of the experimental apparatus, and its size, and of 
the participants’ placement (A and B). H1 and H2 represent the “home” buttons which participants 
maintained pressed during the “resting” phase, while T1 and T2 represent “target” buttons which 
participants were asked to press during the “movement” phase. The central black cross represent the 
fixation point on which participants were asked to maintain their gaze for the whole duration of the 
experiment (redrawn from Welsh et al., 2005). 
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Results 
 
The very first trial of each block was eliminated because, for its nature, it was 
not preceded by a response (3% of total trials), as well as trials on which participants 
broke the alternation pattern or went to the incorrect location (2.4% of total trials). 
Moreover, adopting the same criterion used by Welsh et al. (2005), trials in which 
RTs were smaller than 100 ms or greater than 1000 ms were removed, as judged as 
anticipations and outliers, respectively (0.3% of total trials). 
After data reduction, mean RTs and MTs were submitted to two distinct 
repeated measures ANOVAs with Target position (same vs. different) and Person 
(same vs. different) as within-participants factors. With regards to RTs, the main 
effect of Target position was significant, F(1,9) = 53.96, p < .001, η2p = .857, owing to 
greater RTs in response to the same (M = 309 ms, SE = 10.07) rather then to a 
different (M = 287 ms, SE = 9.18) target position. The interaction Target position × 
Person, crucial to the purpose of this study, did not reach the statistical level of 
significance (p = .166). Nevertheless, for completeness, two-tailed paired-samples t-
test confirmed that RTs were greater in response to the same rather than to a different 
target position both for the within-person, t(9) = 5.402, p < .001, and for the between-
person, t(9) = 5.984, p = .001, trials (see Figure 16). 
With regards to MTs, of lesser importance with respect to RTs to the purpose 
of the present study, the main effect of Person approached statistical significance, 
F(1,9) = 4.454, p = .064, η2p = .331, reflecting greater MTs for between-person (M = 
259 ms, SE = 13.5) than for the within-person (M = 252 ms, SE = 11.5) trials. No 
other results were significant (ps > .1). Nevertheless, for completeness, two-tailed 
paired-samples t-test confirmed that MTs were not different in response to the same 
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rather than to a different target position both for the within-person, t(9) = 1.265, p = 
.238, and for the between-person, t(9) = 1.472, p = .175, trials. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. RT (ms) and MT (ms) as a function of Person and Target position in Experiment 1 
and in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. Asterisk denotes t-test p < .05. NS = not 
significant. 
 
Discussion 
 
In Experiment 1 the main results observed by Welsh et al. (2005) have been 
replicated. In fact, RTs were greater in response to the same rather than to a different 
target position, and this pattern was present both for the within-person and for the 
between-person trials, confirming the presence of both IOR and SIOR. In so doing I 
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have also validated the correct functioning of the experimental apparatus, allowing me 
to persecute with Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 was aimed to investigate whether the perceived similarity 
between participants could modulate the magnitude of the SIOR. In particular, I 
expected that the SIOR of naïve participants was greater in the case of higher than 
lower perceived similarity. Moreover, the gender of couple, that could be either the 
same that different, was considered as well. In so doing, I wanted to evaluated also the 
potential influences of this factor in modulating SIOR, if any. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Forty students (Mean age = 23 years, SD = 2.64, 20 females, 4 left-handed) of 
the University of Padova took part in this study on a voluntary basis. A male (Age = 
21 years, right-handed) and a female (Age = 25 years, left-handed) student 
participated as confederates. All participants, except for the two confederates, were 
naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The local ethic committee approved the study. 
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Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Twenty students (10 females and 10 males) were coupled with the male 
confederate, the remaining 20 students (10 females and 10 males) were coupled with 
the female confederate. In so doing, 20 same-gender couples and 20 different-gender 
couples were obtained, in order to evaluate any potential influence of this variable. In 
most of the cases, each couple resulted also matched for handedness. When this was 
not possible, the confederate performed the task with the same hand used by the naïve 
participant, in order to reduce any potential confounds related with this variable. 
Perceived similarity was manipulated by asking to both participants to fill a 
questionnaire aimed to facilitate the mutual knowledge between them. This 
questionnaire was composed by 13 questions regarding some “hot social topics” such 
as death penalty (i.e., “Are you in favour of death penalty?”) or abortion (i.e., “Are 
you in favour of abortion?”; see Appendix B). Participants were informed that after 
the filling of the questionnaire they could read the answer provided by the other. To 
do that, the naïve participant was conducted in a different room with the excuse that it 
was important to fill the questionnaire in a quiet environment. After that the naïve 
participant filled the questionnaire, this was brought by the experimenter into the 
confederate’s room. At this point, the experimenter filled the confederate’s 
questionnaire on the basis of the responses provided by the naïve participant. In a 
counterbalanced manner between participants, the experimenter could fill the 
questionnaire to create a version with a high degree of similarity, in which all the 
responses, except one, were identical, or to create a version with a low degree of 
similarity, in which all the responses, except one, were different. Subsequently, this 
fictive copy of the confederate’s questionnaire was delivered to the naïve participant 
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with the request to read it, paying attention to every single answer, in order to get an 
idea of the other participant. Finally, the naïve participant was took back to the 
laboratory to complete the joint action task, whose procedure was identical as that 
used in Study 1. 
 
Results 
 
The very first trial of each block was eliminated because, for its nature, it was 
not preceded by a response (3% of total trials), as well as trials on which participants 
broke the alternation pattern or went to the incorrect location (1.9% of total trials). 
Moreover, trials in which RTs were smaller than 100 ms or greater than 1000 ms were 
removed, as judged as anticipations and outliers, respectively (0.7% of total trials). 
After data reduction, mean RTs and MTs were submitted to two distinct 
mixed-design repeated-measures ANOVAs with Target position (same vs. different) 
and Person (same vs. different) as within-participants factors, and Gender of the 
couple (same vs. different) and Degree of similarity (high vs. low) as between-
participants factors. With regards to RTs, the main effect of target position was 
significant, F(1,36) = 130.52, p < .001, η2p = .784, owing to greater RTs in response to 
the same (M = 316 ms, SE = 6.91) than to a different (M = 294 ms, SE = 6.46) target 
position, as well as the main effect of person, F(1,36) = 17.03, p < .001, η2p = .321, 
owing to greater RTs for between-person (M = 313 ms, SE = 7.48) than for the 
within-person (M = 297 ms, SE = 6.28) trials. Also the interaction Target position × 
Gender of the couple was significant, F(1,36) = 5.33, p = .027, η2p = .129. Two-tailed 
paired-samples t-tests between same and different target position divided by gender of 
the couple revealed that RTs were greater when participants had to move towards the 
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same than towards a different target position either when the gender of the couple was 
the same, t(19) = 5.756, p < .001, that different, t(19) = 11.665, p < .001, but IOR was 
bigger in the latter case (17 vs. 26 ms). Finally, the interaction Target position × 
Person was also significant, F(1,36) = 16.62, p < .001, η2p = .316. Two-tailed paired-
samples t-tests between same and different target position divided by person revealed 
that RTs were greater when participants had to move towards the same rather than 
towards a different target position either in the within-person, t(39) = 4.925, p < .001, 
that in the between person, t(39) = 10.59, p < .001, trials, but IOR was bigger in the 
latter case (13 vs. 30 ms; see Figure 16). No other results were significant (ps > .28). 
With regards to MTs the main effect of Target position was significant, 
F(1,36) = 35.44, p < .001, η2p = .496, owing to greater MTs when participants had to 
move towards the same (M = 288 ms, SE = 6.33) rather than towards a different (M = 
276 ms, SE = 5.05) target position. The interaction Target position × Degree of 
similarity was also significant, F(1,36) = 4.33, p = .045, η2p = .107. Two-tailed paired-
samples t-tests between same and different Target position and divided by Degree of 
similarity revealed no differences either when the degree of similarity was low, t(19) 
= 1. 711, p = .103, that high, t(19) = - 1.078, p = .295, but in the latter case the 
difference between MTs for same target position trials and MTs for different target 
position trials was negative (3 ms vs. - 3 ms). Finally, also the interaction Target 
position × Person was significant, F(1,36) = 11.62, p = .002, η2p = .244. Two-tailed 
paired-samples t-tests between same and different target position and divided by 
person revealed that MTs were bigger for same target position than for different target 
position for between-person, t(39) = 3.201, p = .003, but not for within-person, t(39) = 
- 1.886, p = .067, trials. No other results of crucial interest were significant (ps > .057; 
see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Mean RT and mean MT for each condition in Experiment 2. Values in brackets are SEM. V = Valid; I = Invalid. 
Person Same  Different 
Condition Similar Different  Similar Different 
Gender Same Different Same Different  Same Different Same Different 
Trial V I V I V I V I  V I V I V I V I 
RT (ms) 297 
(12) 
288 
(13) 
303 
(12) 
287 
(13) 
292 
(12) 
284 
(13) 
323 
(12) 
303 
(13) 
 
315 
(16) 
294 
(14) 
323 
(16) 
291 
(14) 
315 
(16) 
285 
(14) 
359 
(16) 
324 
(14) 
MT (ms) 273 
(10) 
277 
(11) 
264 
(10) 
273 
(11) 
277 
(10) 
288 
(11) 
280 
(10) 
276 
(11) 
 
287 
(13) 
286 
(12) 
285 
(13) 
282 
(12) 
298 
(13) 
291 
(12) 
294 
(13) 
280 
(12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  116 
Discussion 
 
IOR has been traditionally investigated by testing participants individually 
(e.g., Frischen & Tipper, 2004; Posner & Cohen, 1984). However, recently IOR has 
been observed even when pair of individuals were asked to take part together in a 
joint action task (e.g., Welsh et al., 2005). This task consists of performing 
alternatively aiming movement towards peripheral targets. Typically, results show 
that one person’s responses are slower when these movements are directed towards a 
location previously reached. More importantly, this slowdown in responses emerges 
both in the case the location was previously reached by the same and by the other 
individual, confirming the presence of both IOR and SIOR, respectively. 
The purpose of this study was twofold. Firstly, I wanted to replicate the main 
results observed by Welsh et al. (2005), namely the presence of IOR and SIOR in a 
joint action task. To this end, I conducted Experiment 1 in which a perfect 
reproduction of the apparatus as well as the paradigm employed by Welsh and 
colleagues have been used. Results showed clearly that both IOR that SIOR emerged, 
confirming the correct functioning of the whole experimental procedure. Secondly, I 
wanted to investigate whether manipulating perceived similarity between participant 
could modulate SIOR. To this end, I conducted Experiment 2 in which I employed the 
same apparatus and paradigm as that used in Experiment 1. Perceived similarity 
between participants has been obtained by asking to naïve participants to read some 
fictive information regarding a confederate. In a between-participant design, the 
confederate could be described as very similar or very dissimilar to the naïve 
participant. The main results of Experiment 2 showed that in naïve participants SIOR 
was greater than IOR. That means that their attentional mechanisms have been 
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stronger modulated by the observed confederate’s aiming movements rather than by 
those they executed individually. More interestingly, this pattern of results has been 
observed independently of the fact that the confederate was described to naïve 
participants as very similar or very dissimilar to him/her. This result was unexpected. 
In fact, on the basis of recent evidence, I expected to observe that higher and lower 
perceived similarity should lead to an enhancement and a decrement in social 
attention processes, respectively (e.g., Hungr & Hunt, 2012; Liuzza et al., 2011). 
The results observed in Experiment 2 are difficult to explain. First of all, the 
lack of a manipulation check, that would ensure that naïve participants actually 
perceived the confederate as very similar/dissimilar to them, represents a remarkable 
limit that does not allow me to exclude that this kind manipulation has worked 
properly. Furthermore, with this in mind, on the one hand, one could speculate that 
the simple fact to know some personal information about others could be sufficient to 
modulate SIOR. On the other hand, another explanation could emerge taking into 
account the modality to which the questionnaire was filled. In fact, higher and lower 
perceived similarity was obtained by filling the fictive confederate’s questionnaire in 
two opposite and polarized manners, in which all the responses, except one, were 
identical (i.e., higher perceived similarity) or different (i.e., lower perceived 
similarity) to those provided by the naïve participants. If we consider similarity as a 
variable that develops along a continuum, the probabilities to meet an individual 
extremely similar or extremely different to us are both particularly scarce. However, 
in the case this happens, these particularly rare and peculiar individuals could exert a 
comparable influence on our social attentional processes, as suggested by the data 
collected in the present study. 
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In order to test these two different hypothesis, future studies are currently 
planned in which responses that will appear in the fictive questionnaires will be 
always 50% identical to those provided by the naïve participants. In the case knowing 
something about others is sufficient to modulate SIOR, the same pattern of results as 
that observed in Experiment 2 should emerge, namely a greater SIOR with respect to 
IOR. In the case that the peculiarity which characterized confederates in Experiment 2 
was responsible of the observed modulation, no differences in the magnitude of IOR 
and SIOR should emerge. In this manner, further evidence regarding the role of 
individual differences in modulation social attention could be provided. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VISUAL WORKING MEMORY FOR OTHER-RACE FACES: 
THE ROLE OF GAZE DIRECTION 
 
One issue of utmost importance in psychology refers to how differences in 
race comes to influence behaviour, but only in the last decade advances in 
neuroscience have provided powerful tools to explore brain responses to race 
shedding light on the multi-faced dilemma of racial discrimination. Indeed, a growing 
body of work is finding that people exhibit different patterns of neural activity in 
response to other-race compared with own-race individuals (e.g., Amodio, Harmon-
Jones, & Devine, 2003; Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Ito 
& Senholzi, 2013; Phelps et al., 2000; Richerson et al., 2003; Sessa et al., 2012). For 
instance, recently Sessa et al. (2012) used the Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) 
approach to investigate whether the quality of Visual Working Memory (VWM) 
representations of faces can be modulated by race. In a change detection task, White 
participants were cued to memorize one or two White (own-race) or Black (other-
race) faces displayed in one visual hemifield. These authors quantified the amount of 
information encoded in VWM by monitoring a posterior lateralized negative-going 
neural activity starting roughly 300 ms after the presentation of the to-be-encoded 
own- and other-race faces, namely, the Sustained Posterior Contralateral Negativity 
(SPCN; e.g., Dell'Acqua, Sessa, Jolicœur, & Robitaille, 2006) also known as 
Contralateral Delay Activity (CDA; e.g., Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005). 
The SPCN is an excellent marker of the maintenance of objects representations in 
VWM (e.g., Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), as it increases in amplitude along with the 
amount of information encoded up to the level of VWM saturation (e.g., 3-4 simple 
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stimuli, such as colours) at which point the SPCN amplitude usually reaches an 
asymptote (e.g., Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). More interestingly, it has also been 
reported that VWM representations of faces characterized by lower resolution (less 
accurate encoding of each facial feature and features integration) would correspond to 
reduced SPCN amplitudes (e.g., Sessa, Luria, Gotler, Jolicœur, & Dell’Acqua, 2011). 
In line with this assumption, Sessa et al. (2012) found that White participants showed 
an overall reduced SPCN amplitudes when they were asked to memorize two Black 
faces rather than two White faces. 
According to Valentine (1991) race effects in face perception and recognition 
arise because of the lack of perceptual experience at processing phenotypical features 
of other-race faces (that are clearly different from those of own-race faces), leading to 
other-race faces representations that are less distinctive than own-race faces 
representations. This hypothesis predicts that the functional source of low-precision 
representations of other-race faces compared to own-race faces (that is reduced SPCN 
amplitudes for own-race faces relative to other-race faces) would be the lack of the 
observer’s perceptual experience (i.e., expertise) at processing other-race faces.  
To note, one aspect of critical relevance is that Sessa and collaborates (2012) 
employed as stimuli faces depicting White and Black individuals with direct gaze. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, a key-role in processing information concerning gaze 
direction seems to be played by the amygdala and evidence is accumulating showing 
that even faces depicting individuals of different race activate differentially this 
subcortical structure. In particular, studies have shown that activity in the amygdala 
can be greater (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2004) and habituates more slowly (e.g., Hart 
et al., 2000) following the presentation of other- than own-race faces, and correlates 
with implicit measures of racial prejudice, even if this last pattern was not observed 
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when the faces used as stimuli belonged to familiar and positively regarded other-race 
individuals (e.g., Phelps et al., 2000). More related with the present study, a fMRI 
study revealed that amygdala activity can be moderated by race membership and gaze 
direction in conjunction (Richeson, Todd, Trawalter, & Baird, 2008). In more detail, 
in this study amygdala activity of White participants was enhanced when Black faces 
displayed directed gaze than when boring averted gaze. By contrast, White faces with 
direct and averted gaze produced similar levels of amygdala activity. The same 
pattern of results emerged even when participants where asked to rate on how 
threatening the faces were, namely, Black faces with direct gaze were judged as more 
threatening as compared to Black faces with averted gaze, whereas no differences 
emerged for White faces with direct and averted gaze. In other words, Black faces 
showing a direct gaze would activate the associated threat value to a greater extend 
compared to when they display an averted gaze. This result can be explained by the 
fact that direct gaze can signal negative approach tendencies, such as hostility and 
impending peril (Argyle & Cook, 1976; see also Study 3). Hence, direct gaze may be 
especially significant to observers when communicated by a (potentially) threatening 
other-race member such as a Black individual. Overall, Richeson’s et al. (2008) study 
supports the idea that gaze direction is a critical factor in conveying threat and in 
engaging the amygdala. This evidence suggests that a source, other than the 
observer’s perceptual experience (i.e., expertise) with other-race faces, might 
intervene in reducing the precision of other-race faces’ representations (compared 
with own-race faces’ representations), namely the threat signalled by an outgroup. 
Under a neuroanatomical prospective, in adults it is well known the existence 
of connections between the amygdala and prefrontal areas (e.g., Gee et al., 2013) and 
faces characterized by emotional valence seem to be particularly effective to act as a 
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probe of this amygdala-prefrontal connection (e.g., Whalen et al., 2013). Prefrontal 
areas would be involved in working memory processes (e.g., Courtney, Ungerleider, 
Keil, & Haxby, 1997; Grecucci, Soto, Rumiati, Humphreys, & Rotshtein, 2009; 
McNab & Klingberg, 2008) and, more importantly, they would project to posterior 
areas (Voytek & Knight, 2010) in which VWM would be generated (e.g., Todd & 
Marois, 2004, 2005). Taken together, this evidence suggests the possibility to observe 
a modulation of VWM, reflected in SPCN amplitude, depending on the direction of 
the gaze displayed by other-race members via amygdala activity. In particular, when 
the perceived threat conveyed by an other-race member is low (i.e., averted gaze) the 
amygdala would be similarly active to the condition in which an own-race member is 
displayed, and consequently − if threat perception is a critical factor in modulating 
own- and other-race faces’ representations − the SPCN amplitude should be similar 
for own- and other-race faces. On the contrary, when the perceived threat conveyed 
by an other-race member is high (i.e., direct gaze) an enhanced amygdala activity, 
would lead to a greater interference on VWM processing of faces’ identities. Along 
with these considerations it is indeed crucial to investigate whether VWM 
representations of other- and own-race faces can be modulated also by gaze direction, 
and Study 6 has been conducted with this purpose. 
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2.6. Study 6 
Visual working memory for other-race faces is modulated by gaze direction 
 
Sessa, P., & Dalmaso, M. (In preparation). Visual working memory for other-race 
faces is modulated by gaze direction. 
 
The current investigation was aimed to assess the SPCN modulation in a 
change detection task which required White participants to maintain in VWM 
representations of White (own-race) and Black (other-race) faces displayed with 
direct and averted gaze. I predicted that both race and gaze direction modulate the 
engagement of VWM processing. In particular, I expected to observe a) poorer VWM 
representations of Black faces, with respect to White faces, when displayed with 
direct gaze, and b) comparable VWM representations for Black and White faces when 
displayed with averted gaze. 
 
Experiment 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
27 White students (M= 24 years, SD = 2.22; 13 females; two left-handed) 
from the University of Padova took part in this study on a voluntary basis. All 
reported normal or correct-to-normal vision and were naïve to purpose of the 
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experiment. Informed consent was obtained from all of them. The local ethic 
committee approved the study. 
Data from two participants were excluded because of too many EEG recording 
artefacts, leaving 25 participants for the analyses (M = 24 years, SD = 2.29; 12 
females; two left-handed). 
 
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure 
 
Face stimuli were taken by the Minear and Park (2004) database. In particular, 
I selected 12 White and 12 Black faces with neutral expression. For each face there 
were two versions, the original version depicting faces with direct gaze, and a new 
version depicting faces with averted gaze rightwards or leftwards. This new version 
was created ad-hoc by moving the irises about 0.25° to the right or to the left from the 
original central position using Photoshop CS5. All faces were then resized converted 
in a grey-scale, resized to 3.3° wide × 4.5° height from a viewing distance of 
approximately 70 cm, normalized for contrast and luminance and cropped with an 
ovoid mask in order to omit extraneous cues such as ears, neck and hairline. The 
memory and test arrays were composed by two faces of the same race with both direct 
or averted gaze that were located at the corners of an imaginary rectangle centred 
around fixation. The faces were horizontally aligned and occupied either the upper or 
the lower two quadrants of the visual field. The horizontal distance between the centre 
of two faces was 7° and the distance between the centre of the face and the fixation 
cross was 4.9°. 
Examples of trials are depicted in Figure 17. A centrally-placed black fixation 
cross remained on the screen throughout the trial (Fixation cross frame, Figure 17). 
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After trial initiation, 500 ms elapsed before the presentation of two arrow cues, one 
above and one below the fixation cross, both pointing rightwards or leftwards 
(Predictive cue frame). The two arrow cues were displayed for 200 ms and were 
followed, after a variable Interstimulus Interval (ISI) of 200–400 ms (ISI frame), by 
the memory array of faces, which was displayed for 200 ms (Memory array frame). 
The memory array was composed of two faces. Following the memory array, a blank 
interval of 900 ms (Retention interval frame) preceded the onset of the test array, 
which was exposed until the response (Test array). Each memory and test array 
contained faces of the same race, and trials with white faces and black faces were 
presented in separate blocks presented in a random order. 
Participants were instructed to maintain fixation throughout the trial and to 
memorize only the face in the memory array displayed on the side indicated by the 
arrow cues, and were explicitly informed that the face displayed on the opposite side 
were of no importance for the response they had to make at the end of the trial. The 
task was to compare the cued side of the memory array and test array in order to 
indicate whether the identity of the face had changed. On 50% of the trials, the 
memory array and the test array were identical. On the other 50% of trials, the face on 
the arrow-cued side of the memory array was replaced with a different face in the test 
array. When a change occurred, one face was replaced with a different fac. Half of the 
participants pressed the ‘‘F’’ key to indicate that the face had changed between the 
memory array and the test array and the ‘‘J’’ key to indicate that the memory array 
and the test array were identical. The other half of the participants responded using 
the opposite mapping. The response had to be made without speed pressure and 
participants were explicitly informed that speed of response would not be considered 
to assess their performance. Following the response, a variable intertrial interval of 
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1510-1600 ms elapsed before the presentation of the fixation cross indicating the 
beginning of the next trial. 
There were 4 practical blocks each composed by 16 trials followed by 4 
experimental blocks each composed by 96 trials for a total of 384 experimental trials. 
 
Figure 17. Illustration of the procedure and examples of White (A and B) and Black face-
stimuli (C and D) with direct (A and C) and averted (B and D) gaze. Arrows indicated the to-be-
memorized face during the memory array, that in the test array could remain the same (A and D) or 
change (B and C) with same probability. 
 
 
 
 
ERPs recording and analysis 
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EEG activity was recorded from 64 standard electrodes distributed over the 
scalp according to the international 10/20 system referenced to the left earlobe. The 
EEG was re-referenced offline to the average of the left and right ear- lobes. Trials 
contaminated by eye blinks, large horizontal eye movements or incorrect responses in 
the change detection task were discarded from analysis. I computed contralateral 
waveforms by averaging the activity recorded at right hemisphere electrodes when 
participants were cued to encode the face stimulus on the left side of the memory 
array with the activity recorded from the left hemisphere electrodes when they were 
cued to encode the face stimulus on the right side of the memory array. SPCN was 
quantified at posterior electrodes sites (P7/P8) as the difference in mean amplitude 
between the ipsilateral and contralateral wave-forms in a time window of 300−750 ms 
relative to the onset of the memory array. 
 
Results 
 
ERPs data: SPCN component 
 
SPCN was quantified at posterior electrodes sites (P7/P8) as the difference in 
mean amplitude between the contralateral and the ipsilateral waveforms in a time 
window of 300−750 ms relative to the onset of the memory array. Mean SPCN 
amplitudes were submitted to an ANOVA that considered Gaze direction (direct vs. 
averted) and Race (White vs. Black) as within-subjects factors. The main effect of 
Gaze direction was significant, F(1,24) = 7.852, p = .01, η2p = .247, owing to a greater 
amplitude of SPCN for averted (M = -1.267 µV, SE = .189) than for direct (M= -.782 
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µV, SE = .237) gaze, whereas the main effect of race was not significant (p = .589). 
The interaction Gaze direction × Race was, however, significant, F(1,24) = 5.162, p = 
.032, η2p = .177. Planned comparisons indicated that SPCN amplitude did not differ 
between Black (M= -1.365 µV, SE = .211) and White (M = -1.17 µV, SE = .19) faces 
with averted gaze, t(24) = 1.532, p = .139, whereas SPCN amplitude was smaller for 
Black (M = -.633 µV, SE = .276) then for White (M = -.931 µV, SE = .22) faces with 
direct gaze, t(24) = 1.891, p = .07, even if this result approached the statistical level of 
significance. Moreover, SPCN amplitude did not differ between White faces with 
direct and averted gaze, t(24) = 1.553, p = .134, whereas SPCN amplitude was smaller 
for Black faces displayed with direct rather than with averted gaze, t(24) = 2.989, p = 
.006 (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. SPCN plotted as a function of race (black vs. white) and gaze direction (averted vs. 
direct). The grey rectangle indicates the SPCN temporal window (300−750 ms). 
 
Behavioural data: Accuracy and Reaction Times 
 
Mean accuracy was submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA that considered 
Gaze direction (direct vs. averted) and Race (white vs. black) as within-subjects 
factors. The main effect of Gaze direction was significant, F(1,24) = 7.86, p = .01, η2p 
= .247, owing to greater mean accuracy in response to direct (Mean accuracy = 86 %, 
SE = 1.17) than averted (Mean accuracy = 84 %, SE = 1.17) gaze. No other results 
were significant (ps > .373). 
A second repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the mean RTs of correct 
trials (84.94 % of total trials), with the same factors as earlier, did not reveal any 
significant main effect or interaction (ps > .326). 
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Discussion 
 
In the present study, I used the ERP approach to assess whether gaze direction 
influenced the efficiency of VWM maintenance of information about the identity of 
own- and other-race individuals. To this end, I used a spatially cued variant of a 
standard change detection task and I quantified neural activity associated with VWM 
maintenance of own-race (White) and other-race (Black) faces, displaying both direct 
and averted gaze, by monitoring SPCN responses (e.g., Dell’Acqua et al., 2006; Sessa 
et al., 2011, 2012). As expected, results showed that SPCN amplitude tended to be 
smaller for Black than for White faces when these were presented with direct gaze. 
On the contrary, no differences in SPCN amplitude have been observed in response to 
Black and White faces displayed with averted gaze. Furthermore, SPCN amplitude 
was larger for Black faces displaying averted rather than direct gaze, whereas for 
White faces SPCN amplitude was unaffected by gaze direction. Overall, this pattern 
of results is in line with my general hypothesis and confirm that White individuals 
tend to form a worse representation of Black faces when these are present with direct. 
Interestingly, the behavioural data of accuracy failed to capture an analogous 
pattern of results. In fact, overall participants committed less errors in response to 
faces with direct than with averted gaze. Despite, on the one hand, this could be 
interpreted as a discrepancy with ERPs results, on the other hand it is consistent with 
previous behavioural studies which showed that faces displaying direct eye gaze 
facilitates person construal and social categorization (e.g., Macrae et al., 2002). So, it 
seems that also in the present study, it was easier to discriminate a change in facial 
identity when stimuli appeared with direct rather than averted gaze, at least at the 
behavioural level. It is worth to point put that discrepancies between behavioural and 
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ERPs results are quite common. In fact, in many different studies variations at the 
neural level did not find an analogous correspondence at the behavioural level of 
observation (e.g. Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Phelps et al., 2000; Heil, Rolke, & 
Pecchinenda, 2004). A shared view about that would suggest that brain responses may 
be more sensitive to subtle processing differences than behavioural measures and, 
therefore, owing to their higher sensitivity, neural measures of brain activity may 
convey information on possible modulations affecting the processing underlying a 
particular cognitive task even when such modulations do not translate into overt, or 
even the same, behavioural manifestations. Moreover, behavioural and neural 
measures could also reflect different stages in the process concerning face 
identification (see Wilkinson & Halligan, 2004).  
As discussed in the introductory section, ERPs results may be explained taking 
into account the possible modulatory effect that amygdala, which should be involved 
in processing the emotional valence of faces, would have on the posterior areas in 
which VWM would be generated. In particular, greater or lesser amygdala activation 
would lead respectively to worse or better representation of the identity of the faces in 
VWM. Therefore, the results of the present study seem consistent overall with the 
available neuroimaging and neuropsychological data. 
To conclude, these results further demonstrate the importance of eye-gaze 
cues in shaping processes involved in social cognition (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Emery, 2000; Frischen et al., 2007; Shepherd, 2010). In future work, I hope to build 
upon the findings of the present study to determine the pattern of results could emerge 
when the sample is composed by Black individuals. In fact, converging evidence is 
showing that even Black individuals, who live in Western countries, would show 
more positive prejudice towards Whites than Blacks (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1939; 
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Steele, 1997; Gündemir, Homan, de Dreu, van Vugt, 2014). This overall positive 
disposal towards Whites could lead to similar results as those reported in the present 
study, with an SPCN amplitude that could be larger for Black faces displaying averted 
rather than direct gaze, whereas the SPCN amplitude for White faces could still 
remain unaffected by gaze direction. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Human beings, as well as other animal species, are particularly interested in 
where other individuals are looking at (e.g., Emery, 2000; Shepherd, 2010). The 
ability to orient our own attentional resources in response to spatial cues provided by 
others, which is generally called social attention (e.g., Nummenmaa & Calder, 2008), 
is crucial to successfully navigate within environment and social groups. In fact, on 
the one side, social attention allows to discover potential interesting stimuli around us, 
such as a source of food or a danger (e.g., Frischen et al., 2007). On the another side, 
it is considered to be a precursor to more refined and complex social skills, such as 
the capacity to establish an empathic contact with others (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Emery, 2000). Others’ focus can be inferred by using, in particular, gaze direction, 
head direction, and body orientation (e.g., Perrett & Emery, 1994). Because these 
three social cues would be able to influence orienting independently (e.g., Hietanen, 
2002; Langton & Bruce, 2000), they have been presented in isolation in the vast of the 
majority of the studies concerning social attention (e.g., Frischen et al., 2007). 
Aim of the present thesis was to investigate the potential role of some social 
variables in modulating social attention. Due to the fact that social attention can be 
considered a multifaceted phenomenon, I have decided to employ different paradigms 
and different techniques to deal with this complexity, approaching social attention 
both from behavioural and neural perspectives. In Chapter 2 I have widely employed 
a behavioural paradigm known as gaze-cueing paradigm (e.g., Dalmaso et al., 2012, 
2013; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), that consists, generally, of presenting centrally-
placed faces with averted gaze rightwards or leftwards. Despite this paradigm has 
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been introduced almost two decades ago, researchers have surprisingly neglected for 
many years the potential impact of social variables in modulating gaze-mediated 
orienting of attention. Only in recent years this aspect has gained the interest that it 
deserves, as confirmed by a number of studies that is consistently increasing. In 
Chapter 3, another behavioural paradigm has been used to investigate a particular 
aspect of social attention known as social inhibition of return (e.g., Welsh et al., 
2005). This has represented to me the first attempt to push my research towards a 
more ecological perspective. In fact, unlike the studies illustrated in Chapter 2 in 
which all participants, tested individually, were asked to “interact” with simulated 
people, here two participants were asked to sit opposite each other and to complete 
together a joint action task. In so doing, I have tried to reproduce what actually 
happens during real life interactions which are based on continuous and repeated 
mutual influences with other real individuals. Finally, Chapter 4 represents a change 
in perspective with respect to the previous two chapters, since here I have employed 
ERP technique to investigate the role of gaze direction in modulating VWM. This 
kind of deviation from the main topic of my research should be seen as an attempt to 
explore a related aspect of social attention. In fact, eye gaze, which is probably the 
most important cue used by individuals to infer others’ focus (e.g., Emery, 2000), 
plays a crucial role even on basic aspects of processes concerning person perception 
(e.g., Macrae et al., 2002). For this reason, I believe that every researcher interested in 
social attention should consider the idea to explore even this complementary field of 
research, in order to obtain a more holistic view about the impact of social cues 
provided by others on our cognitive processes. 
Overall, I think that my studies provide further evidence in support of two 
main phenomena. On the one hand, I have confirmed that attentional resources of 
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human beings can be modulated by spatial cues provided by others. On the other 
hand, the way in which such modulation occurs is related to a large extent with many 
social features that characterize individuals. From my point of view, one of the 
greatest limitations of my studies is represented by the degree of ecological validity, 
which is still particularly weak. In fact, the phenomenon of social attention is, by 
definition, a social phenomenon. Despite the fact that the simplification of the 
experimental setting imposed by the scientific rigor is a key factor to achieve a robust 
and a consistent advancement of knowledge, it should not be forgotten that the 
purpose of any research conducted in in the field of social cognition would be to study 
social processes as they take place, namely as an interaction that two, or more, 
individuals have in a social context in the real world. The potential lack of ecological 
validity that can affect many researches regarding the study of human behaviour, has 
been the focus of a lively and interdisciplinary debate which involved not only 
psychologists, but more in general thinkers and scientists belonging to many different 
sectors of social sciences (e.g., Birmingham & Kingstone, 2009; Dennett, 1969, 1978; 
Kingstone, 2009; Kingstone, Smilek, Ristic, Friesen, & Eastwood, 2003; Neisser, 
1976; Skarratt, Cole, & Kuhn, 2012). In particular, Kingstone and collaborators 
proposed an innovative approach to study human cognition, which to some extent can 
be considered as a point break with respect to traditional studies in experimental 
psychology, that has been named “cognitive ethology” (e.g., Kingstone, Smilek, & 
Eastwood, 2008). The main assumption of the cognitive ethology approach proposed 
by Kingstone is that researchers should firstly observe how people behave in their 
natural environments and, only later, move to the laboratory to develop paradigms and 
techniques that allow to test hypothesis generated by real-world observations. In so 
doing, some of the limitations that generally characterized artificial laboratory 
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experiments could be overcome (see also Skarratt et al., 2012; Pfeiffer, et al. 2013). In 
that sense, Study 5 could be considered as a quite good example of a cognitive 
ethology approach. However, I believe that another effort can be done along this 
direction, that is the idea that experiments concerning social attention should not be 
conducted necessarily in a laboratory but can even take place in the real world. This is 
now made possible thanks to the introduction of new generation instruments such as, 
for instance, portable eye trackers or cameras. These instruments allow to monitor 
participant’s eye movements providing information about what participants see as 
well as where they are looking whilst they are carrying out different types of everyday 
tasks, or simply interacting with other individuals (e.g., Gallup, Chong, & Cozin, 
2012; Gallup et al., 2012). This real-world approach could be applied successfully not 
only to assess the impact of many social variables on social attention, but even to 
more sophisticated abilities such as Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM), namely the 
ability to assign mental states to oneself and to others (see Chapter 1). For instance, 
despite the considerable and growing interest surrounding the study of ToMM, the 
question of whether ToMM occurs automatically, namely without any conscious 
effort, or instead it is subject to a volitional control is still open and represents the 
focus of a lively debate. On the one hand, evidence in support of an automatic ToMM 
has been reported by using many different paradigms which also include the gaze-
cueing paradigm (e.g., Teufel et al., 2009, 2010a,b). In fact, when an observer notices 
that another individual is looking towards a spatial location or an object, a mental 
state such as an intention or a goal towards that spatial location or object can be 
assumed to be occurring (see also Calder et al., 2002). On the other hand, other 
studies have challenged the idea that ToMM can take place automatically (e.g., 
Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Samson, & Chiavarino, 2006). Regardless of what may be 
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the solution to this problem, which go beyond the scope of this thesis, I believe that 
even in this case a more ecological approach, based on paradigms that involve real 
social interactions, could provide new ideas and new starting points. Indeed, since in 
most of the studies concerning ToMM participants are generally required to attribute 
(consciously or not) a mental state to an individual, this individual should be real and 
not a simulated agent, given that a simulated agent should not be able to generate, by 
definition, any kind of mental state. 
Even if I am pretty sure that the cold walls of the laboratory will still remain 
standing for a long time, the new insights that, potentially, could emerge by applying 
these two new approaches, will push the study of social attention towards stimulating, 
and probably unexpected, frontiers. Hopefully, in my small way, I hope that even my 
future studies will help to any extent to reach that unexplored land. 
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Appendix A. 
 
High- and low-status CVs, associated with older adult faces, used in Study 1 (Experiment 1). CVs from 
1 to 3 of both categories have been used also in Experiments 2/A and 2/B. 
 
  High-status CVs    Low-status CVs 
1. Dean of a Faculty of Architecture. President 
of the “European Eco-Sustainable 
Constructions Society”. 
 1. Retired factory worker. After the elementary 
school he worked in the textile industry. 
2. Dean of a Faculty of Economy. He is 
director of the journal “Economy & 
Management”. 
 2. Retired agricultural worker. After the 
elementary school he worked as a labourer in a 
farm. 
3. Dean of a Faculty of Medicine. He 
developed an innovative surgical techniques 
for the treatment of digestive tract tumours. 
 3. Retired mason. He started to work after two 
years of elementary school. 
4. Dean of a Faculty of Agricultural. He is 
president of the “Italian Association of Plant 
Biology”. 
 4. Retired dustman. He left middle school after 
two years. 
5. Dean of a Faculty of Biology. He is 
member of the “Centre for International 
Studies and Research in Toxicology". 
 5. Retired factory worker. He holds the middle 
school diploma and he has always worked in 
the food industry. 
6. Dean of a Faculty of Veterinary Medicine. 
He coordinates the “International Society for 
Animal Genetics”. 
 6. Retired waiter. He attended a vocational 
school. 
7. Dean of a Faculty of Mathematics. His 
research has found numerous applications in 
the field of space exploration. 
 7. Retired factory worker. He did not complete 
primary school. 
8. Dean of a Faculty of Engineering. He is 
involved in the Atlas project, the biggest 
experiment on the physic of High Energies. 
 8. Retired janitor. He has no qualification. 
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High- and low-status CVs, associated with younger adult faces, used in Study 1 (Experiment 1). 
 
  High-status CVs    Low-status CVs 
1. Graduated with honours in Pharmaceuticals 
Chemistry. He is currently working in the 
research centre of a multinational 
pharmaceutical company. 
 1. After the compulsory education he started 
to work as a workman in a textile industry. 
2. Graduated with honours in Aerospace 
Engineering. He is working as a researcher at a 
company engaged in the development of civil 
aircrafts. 
 2. After the compulsory education he is still 
looking for stable employment. He works 
occasionally as a dishwasher in a pizzeria. 
 
3. Graduated with honours in Biotechnology. 
He is currently doing a PhD in the field of 
animal biotechnology. 
 3. After the compulsory education he got a job 
at a call centre with a time limited contract. 
4. Graduated with honours in physics. He is 
currently working as researcher in a famous 
European laboratory. 
 4. After the compulsory education he started 
to work as a warehouseman in a small 
provincial company. 
5. Graduated with honours in Computer 
Science. He is currently working as a 
developer in one of the world’s most 
appreciated software houses. 
 5. He terminated the compulsory education 
and he is still looking for a job. 
6. Graduated with honours in Economics. He 
works as a researcher at a leader institution 
that deals with financial analysis. 
 6. After repeating the last year of high school, 
he started to work occasionally in the 
workshop of a friend. 
7. Graduated with honours in Mathematics. He 
started a PhD at a prestigious university. 
 7. After the compulsory education he is 
looking for a job in industry though a 
temporary employment agency. 
8. Graduated with honours in Medicine. He is 
currently doing a specialization in cardiac 
surgery at a famous clinic of transplants. 
 8. After beginning his university studies 
without success he is currently doing 
leafleting for a supermarket. 
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Appendix B. 
 
Questions and possible answers that composed the questionnaire used in Study 5. 
 
1. Are you in favour of death penalty? YES - NO 
2. What is your political temperament? LIBERAL - CONSERVATIVE 
3. Are you in favour of abortion? YES - NO 
4. What is your religious orientation? CATHOLIC - ATHEIST - OTHER 
5. Are you in favour of the legalization of the light drugs? YES - NO 
6. Are you in favour of the use of nuclear energy in Italy? YES - NO 
7. Are you in favour of Italian military interventions abroad? YES - NO 
8. Are you in favour of the extension of civil rights to same-sex couples? YES - NO 
9. Are you in favour to adoption by same-sex couples? YES - NO 
10. Do you think that euthanasia should be legalized in Italy? YES - NO 
11. Do you agree with the recent installation of a technical government? YES - NO 
12. Are you in favour of the parliamentary immunity? YES - NO 
13. Are you in favour of the intervention of the Church in Italian politics? YES - NO 
